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ABSTRACT 
The global investigations into the manipulation of the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) have raised significant questions about 
how conflicts of interest are managed for regulated entities contributing 
to benchmarks. An alternative framework, which brings the management 
of the rate process under direct regulatory supervision, is under consid-
eration, coordinated by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions taskforce. The articulation of global principles builds on a 
review commissioned by the British government that suggests rates cal-
culated by submission can be reformed. This paper argues that this ap-
proach is predestined to fail, precisely because it ignores the lessons of 
history. In revisiting the initial framing for market conduct regulation, 
this paper illuminates the lost normative underpinnings of the disclosure 
paradigm. By exploring the shadows of the past, it provides an essential 
guide for how to fix the legitimacy crisis engendered by the Libor scan-
dal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) 
and associated benchmarks has far-reaching consequences for the finan-
cial institutions involved and for the integrity of the regulatory regimes 
charged with their oversight. The scandal derives from pervasive and 
widespread collusion between traders and those responsible—in major 
banks—for submitting hypothetical rates at which individual banks could 
raise financing. When aggregated by Thomson Reuters, those rates pro-
duce a daily benchmark interest rate. This rate is then used to benchmark 
trillions of dollars of derivative contracts in the over-the-counter (OTC) 
marketplace. The misconduct, designed to facilitate trading positions, as 
well as to create the erroneous impression of the health of individual 
banks, corrupted the market. To date, three major banks—Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), Barclays in the United Kingdom, and the Swiss-
domiciled UBS—have reached settlements with regulatory authorities in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Switzerland, with the 
cumulative fine standing at $2.6 billion dollars. These settlements mark 
the start rather than the conclusion of the process. An investigation in 
Singapore implicated major U.S. banks in attempts to manipulate the 
Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (Sibor). It is, therefore, only a matter 
of time before regulatory attention crosses the Atlantic to Manhattan. 
The ongoing litigation risk cascades outwards from civil and crimi-
nal enforcement to individual and institutional class action claims. The 
structural and reputational risks are just as significant. Six years after the 
August 2007 onset of the global fiancial crisis, with the vaporization of 
the securitization market, regulatory authorities across the globe remain 
mired in crisis management. Within that timeframe, we have moved pro-
gressively from a rubric of “too big to fail” to a dawning recognition that 
systemically important financial firms are not only too big to manage and 
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regulate but also too big to litigate effectively against. This recognition 
comes through most notably in the caustic and incisive questioning of 
Senator Elizabeth Warren.
1
 We are now at a paradigmatic tipping point. 
Given Libor’s pricing implications for the OTC marketplace as the key 
floating rate benchmark, has it become too big to change? This remains 
very much an open question. 
British regulatory authorities maintain that Libor and submission-
based benchmarks can be reformed. In sharp contrast, the United States 
is much more wary of reliance on the judgments of individual bankers. 
The chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Gary 
Gensler, is cognizant of the need for an urgent replacement to Libor “to 
restore market integrity and promote financial stability.”2 As he put it in 
a recent interview with the Financial Times, “A benchmark that becomes 
untethered [from reality] becomes vulnerable to all sorts of miscon-
duct. . . . It’s best that we not fall prey to accepting that Libor or any oth-
er benchmark is too big to replace.”3 The Financial Stability Oversight 
Council in the United States has provided strong support for this proposi-
tion. This umbrella network of financial regulators has demanded a tran-
sition to an observable transaction framework, as a matter of urgency.
4
 
                                                        
 1. Justin O’Brien, Educating Regulators: A Professorial Master Class, CENTRE FOR L., 
MARKETS & REG., UNIV. NEW S. WALES (Feb. 15, 2013) (Austl.), http://clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/ 
compliance/market-conduct-regulation/educating-regulators-professorial-masterclass; Malcolm S. 
Salter, Short-Termism at Its Worst: How Short-Termism Invites Corruption . . . and What to Do 
About It (Edmond J. Safra Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 5, 2013), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247545; Gregg Fields, What Institutional Corruption Shares 
with Obscenity (Edmond J. Safra Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 6, 2013), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2252033. 
 2. Brooke Masters & Philip Stafford, CFTC’s Gensler Says Libor ‘Unsustainable,’ FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f5d2c816-ab4b-11e2-ac71-00144feabdc0.html#axzz 
2SAkFoWi5. 
 3. Id. 
 4. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2013), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOC%202013%20Annual%20Report.pdf. The 
report states that 
[t]he shift away from banks funding each other in an unsecured market has led to a scar-
city or outright absence in longer tenors of real transactions underpinning these bench-
mark rates and has exacerbated vulnerabilities of these benchmarks. Yet currently, hun-
dreds of trillions of dollars in derivatives, loans, and other financial instruments reference 
these benchmarks. This situation leaves the financial system with benchmarks that are 
prone to and provide significant incentives for misconduct.  
 Given these vulnerabilities and the real risk that they will remain, in order to ensure 
market integrity and support financial stability, the Council recommends that U.S. regula-
tors cooperate with foreign regulators, international bodies, and market participants to 
promptly identify alternative interest rate benchmarks that are anchored in observable 
transactions and are supported by appropriate governance structures, and to develop a 
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The interventionist agenda reflects the renewed power of the United 
States Department of Justice to frame financial regulation discourse, a 
position it last accrued in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002.5 Given its centrality in leading an interna-
tional investigation that to date has seen the imposition of $2.6 billion in 
fines against three leading banks—RBC, Barclays, and UBS—the De-
partment of Justice’s emphasis on retribution, accountability, and pun-
ishment matters as much as the development of fair, effective, and effi-
cient markets.
6
 The renewed emphasis on criminal prosecutions, albeit 
against foreign subsidiaries, stands in marked contrast to the lack of 
criminal indictments in relation to unethical and dubious conduct ex-
posed by the financial crisis. This can be traced, in part, to public outrage 
over the statute of limitations precluding holding those responsible to 
account for their actions and, in part, to the simplicity and blatant nature 
of the Libor deception. The Libor investigation, which remains at an ear-
ly stage, has exposed systematic and pervasive corruption in the rate-
setting process. 
Recent investigations uncovered systematic false reporting and ma-
nipulations of reference rate submissions dating back many years. 
This misconduct was designed to either increase the potential profit 
of the submitting firms or to convey a misleading picture of the 
relative health of the submitting banks. These actions were perva-
sive, occurred in multiple bank locations around the world, involved 
                                                                                                                            
plan to accomplish a transition to new benchmarks while such alternative benchmarks are 
being identified.  
Id. Observable transactions, however, are no guarantee against manipulation. See Salter, supra note 
1; see also Andrew Cornell, UBS Traders ‘Tried to Game’ Australian Benchmark, AUSTL. FIN. REV. 
(Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.afr.com/p/business/companies/ubs_traders_tried_to_game_australian_0B 
bkz7A5PfZvHJQpe3UytK. The mechanism for setting the rate was abolished on March 28, 2013. 
Lincoln Feast, Australia to End Interbank Rate-Setting Panel After Libor Scandal, REUTERS (Mar. 
28, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/australia-libor-bbsw-idUSL2N0CJ2DG201 
30328.  
 5. The power dissipated through a series of miscalculations that saw its authority diminish, 
most notably the continued prosecution of individual KPMG partners after the firm itself agreed to a 
negotiated prosecution. See JUSTIN O’BRIEN, REDESIGNING FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE POLITICS 
OF ENFORCEMENT 27–54 (Wiley 2006). 
 6. “Libor will prove to be one of the largest, if not the largest white-collar case [sic] in history. 
It goes after financial institutions, and it goes after the most major players in Wall Street.” Interview 
by FRONTLINE PBS with Lanny Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div. (Nov. 
30, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/ 
untouchables/lanny-breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished; see also Gregg Fields, No 
Charge: Why Regulatory Institutions Have Prosecuted So Few Bankers; and Why It Matters, 
EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. BLOG, HARVARD U. (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab/ 
blog/254-no-charge  
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senior bank officials at several banks, and affected multiple bench-
mark rates and currencies, including LIBOR, EURIBOR, and the 
Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR). Each of the banks that 
faced charges engaged in a multi-year pattern of misconduct that 
involved collusion with other banks. These revelations have under-
mined the public’s confidence in these benchmarks.
7
 
The paucity of institutional memory in leading banks, the fact that 
manipulation continued even after bailouts, and a baleful reality of con-
tinued compartmentalized responsibility have made business ethics ap-
pear to be little more than an oxymoron.
8
 As the investigation moves in-
exorably towards the major Wall Street banks involved in these account-
ability deficits, debates are likely to intensify, hence, in part, the move-
ment in the United States towards a more radical approach. 
In the United Kingdom, by contrast, a much more nuanced ap-
proach has been adopted, marked by an extensive consultation process 
(albeit one dominated by insiders).
9
 Martin Wheatley, chair of the Finan-
                                                        
 7. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 137 (emphasis added). 
 8. Alasdair MacIntyre, Why Are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble?, in MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PROFESSIONS 358 (Bernard Baumrin & Benjamin Freedman eds., 1982) 
(“Effectiveness in organizations is often both the product and the producer of an intense focus on a 
narrow range of specialized tasks which has as its counterpart a blindness to other aspects of one’s 
activity.”); see also Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral Agency, 74 
PHIL. 311, 322 (1999) (Compartmentalization occurs when a “distinct sphere of social activity 
comes to have its own role structure governed by its own specific norms in relative independence of 
other such spheres. Within each sphere those norms dictate which kinds of consideration are to be 
treated as relevant to decision-making and which are to be excluded.”). For another systemic cause, 
see Salter, supra note 1. 
 9. See HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 75 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter WHEATLEY REVIEW], available at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_final 
report_280912.pdf (outlining case for reform). The review recommended that Libor should no longer 
be administered by the British Banking Association but by a new body chosen through a tendering 
process. Id. at 8. The tendering process—which opened on February 26, 2013, a day after the British 
Banking Association agreed to its mandate at an extraordinarily general meeting—is overseen by an 
independent committee led by the cross-bench peer, Baroness Sarah Hogg, the chair of the Financial 
Reporting Council, which regulates the audit profession in the United Kingdom. Other members of 
the committee include Paul Fisher (Bank of England), George Handjinicolaou (Deputy CEO of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association), John Kingman (Second Permanent Secretary at 
the Department of Treasury), John Stewart (Chair of Legal & General former head of National Aus-
tralia Bank), Colin Tyler (Association of Corporate Treasurers), and Martin Wheatley (Financial 
Conduct Authority). The terms of reference note that the tender process will result in a recommenda-
tion to the British Banking Association, which will then enter a contract with the new administrator. 
Moreover, “the new administrator will be required to be authorized by the Financial Conduct Au-
thority (FCA). The administrator will also be expected to administer and govern LIBOR in such a 
manner that credibility will be restored in the benchmark in accordance with any relevant FCA rules, 
both new and existing.” HOGG TENDERING ADVISORY COMM. FOR LIBOR, TERMS OF REFERENCE 1 
(2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
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cial Conduct Authority and an important figure in the regulatory rede-
sign, is as critical as his counterparts in the United States of Libor’s 
shortcomings. He has referred to it as “a broken system built on flawed 
incentives, incompetence[,] and the pursuit of narrow interests that are to 
the detriment of markets, investors[,] and ordinary people.”10 Critically, 
however, Wheatley concluded that Libor “can be fixed through a com-
prehensive and far-reaching program[] of reform. Although the current 
system is broken, it is not beyond repair, and it is up to us—regulators 
and market participants—to work together towards a lasting and sustain-
able solution.”11 This is a very dubious assumption. 
There is no attempt in this policy calibration to change the norma-
tive foundations of the market. Instead, it is predicated on a continued 
belief that a re-ordering of technical rules and reliance on general princi-
ples will be sufficient. Without tackling the social norms of the market, 
however, the agenda is likely to privilege symbolism over substance. As 
this paper will show, such reasoning is a tactical and strategic mistake. 
At its core the reform process, which envisages a gradual transfer 
towards observable transactions, is predicated on continued reliance on 
market participants to operate ethically within an ostensibly more rigor-
ous system of oversight.
12
 It does so because of an acknowledged fear 
that “a transition to a new benchmark or benchmarks would pose an un-
acceptably high risk of significant financial instability, and risk large-
scale litigation between parties holding contracts that reference 
LIBOR.”13 Notwithstanding the Financial Conduct Authority’s renewed 
emphasis on the critical importance of culture, both renewal and reform 
are likely to fail unless the core ethical deficit at the heart of contempo-
rary banking is systematically addressed. 
The pre-tendering process in the United Kingdom, the pronounce-
ments of the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States, 
                                                                                                                            
191850/the_hogg_tendering_advisory_committee_for_libor_terms_of_reference.pdf. The British 
government expects a successor body to be in place by this summer. Id. 
 10. Martin Wheatley, Managing Dir., Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech Delivered at the Wheatley 
Review of LIBOR, Pushing the Reset Button on LIBOR (Sept. 28, 2012), available at www.fsa.gov. 
uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0928-mw.shtml. 
 11. Id. 
 12. “While Libor needs to be reformed to address the weaknesses that have been identified, it 
would not be appropriate for the authorities to completely take over the process of producing a 
benchmark which exists primarily for the benefit of market participants.” WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra 
note 9, at 7. The review, however, places within a statutory framework provided by the Financial 
Services Authority (now Financial Conduct Authority) “an Approved Persons regime, to provide the 
assurance of credible independent supervision, oversight and enforcement, both civil and criminal.” 
Id. at 8. 
 13. Id. at 7. 
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and the consultation process coordinated by the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) fail to provide confidence that 
the framing will specify any normative obligation.
14
 Likewise, there has 
been little evidence of tangible changes to deleterious cultural framing 
from within the entities themselves, beyond handwringing.
15
 The failure 
to take into account the way in which the banking sector has interacted 
with myriad parliamentary and congressional inquiries provides evidence 
that such an emasculated approach to regulatory redesign will not pro-
duce the kind of transformation broader society demands in the aftermath 
of the bailouts necessary to save the banking sector from its own mis-
judgments and irresponsibility. A reliance on stated obligation to society 
from the sector is simply not credible given the scale of the deception 
exposed in the rate manipulation scandal. 
It is dispiriting—but nonetheless inescapable—that the financial 
sector’s commitments to enhanced self-regulation have proved incapable 
of arresting a decline in its trustworthiness.
16
 For example on Wednes-
day, September 29, 2010, senior financiers based in London committed 
to subjugating the profit motive of trading floors and financial advisors 
to what was termed “a larger social and moral purpose which governs 
                                                        
 14. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS CONSULTATION 
REPORT (2013), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en//affairs/AffairsIOSCO/201304/ 
P020130418535691256394.pdf. “The majority of IOSCO members do not regulate Benchmark 
Administrators or Submitters. Nor does this Report make specific recommendations with respect to 
any particular Benchmarks. Nonetheless, IOSCO members should consider whether regulatory ac-
tion (or recommendations for action by other relevant National Authorities in their own jurisdiction) 
may be appropriate to encourage implementation of the principles.” Id. at 5. For discussion of the 
principles, see infra notes 117–122 and accompanying text. 
 15. In evidence before the Treasury Select Committee on January 9, 2013, the head of invest-
ment banking at UBS, Andrea Orcel, conceded “these are industry-wide problems. . . . We all got 
probably too arrogant, too self-convinced that things were correct the way they were. I think the 
industry needs to change.” Mark Scott, UBS Executives Questioned by Parliament over Rate-
Rigging Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013, 7:37 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/british-
parliament-questions-ubs-executives-in-wake-of-1-5-billion-fine/?src=dlbksb. Mark Carney, the 
incoming Governor of the Bank of England, notes that  
over the past year, the questions of competence have been supplanted by questions of 
conduct. Several major foreign banks and their employees have been charged with crimi-
nal activity, including the manipulation of financial benchmarks, such as LIBOR, money 
laundering, unlawful foreclosure and the unauthorized use of client funds. These abuses 
have raised fundamental doubts about the core values of financial institutions. 
Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Address at the University of Western Ontanrio Ivey School 
of Business, Rebuilding Trust in Global Banking (Feb. 25, 2013) (Can.). 
 16. Justin O’Brien, Re-Regulating Wall Street: Substantive Change or the Politics of Symbol-
ism Revisited?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 423 (Iain MacNeil & Justin O’Brien 
eds., Hart Publ’g 2010). 
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and limits how they behave.”17 Corporate responsibility to society, it was 
argued, could not be shirked or delegated by the board and senior man-
agement: “Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the leaders of financial 
institutions—not their regulators, shareholders or other stakeholders—to 
create, oversee and imbue their [organizations] with an enlightened cul-
ture based on professionalism and integrity. As leaders of financial insti-
tutions we recognize and accept this personal responsibility.”18 
The pledge provided what appeared to be a demonstrable commit-
ment to higher ethical standards. It is indicative that the key signatory 
was Marcus Agius, the chairman of Barclays, one of the first financial 
institutions to accept pervasive wrongdoing in the Libor scandal. How-
ever, the public commitments entered into in 2010 are rendered indefen-
sible by Barclays’s initial failure to admit responsibility in the Libor 
scandal. It is indicative that the pledge coincided with the regulatory in-
vestigation into Barclays and the other banks involved in contributing to 
Libor. Moreover, the financial penalties extracted from the bank simply 
amount to a cost of doing business. It is telling that regulators only 
moved to force the resignation of senior personnel after public and par-
liamentary outrage at the paucity of the initial settlement. It is, therefore, 
essential to evaluate the drivers of deviance at both a descriptive and the-
oretical level before ascertaining whether the reform agenda proposed is 
going to be workable. 
Corporate culpability for individual ethical failures is invariably 
and inevitably informed by the relative strength or weakness of organiza-
tional culture (that is, the degree to which egregious conduct is informed 
by a disconnect between stated and lived values).
19
 The disjunction can 
lie along a continuum, ranging from unthinking or willful neglect, 
through reliance on formal but often transacted-around compliance pro-
grams, to misaligned incentives.
20
 These corporate agendas take place 
within broader governance and legal frameworks. 
                                                        
 17. Marcus Agius et al., Financial Leaders Pledge Excellence and Integrity, FIN. TIMES, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb26484e-cb2d-11df-95c0-00144feab49a.html#axzz2C8HKL1jb 
(last updated Sept. 29, 2010, 6:40 AM). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Jesper B. Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of Firm Perfor-
mance, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 70, 73–91 (2002). Sorensen defines culture narrowly as a system of 
shared values (that define what is important) and norms that define appropriate attitudes and behav-
iors for organizational members (how to feel and behave). Id. at 72; see also Linda Smircich, Con-
cepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339 (1983) (noting that research 
into corporate culture is an inquiry into the social order). 
 20. Gedeon J. Rossouw & Leon J. van Vuuren, Modes of Managing Morality: A Descriptive 
Model of Strategies for Managing Ethics, 46 J. BUS. ETHICS 389 (2003) (noting a five stage process 
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Recent legislative innovations to address cultural failings, particu-
larly in the United States, have resulted in the design of regulatory struc-
tures that are suboptimal for societal welfare. Ironically, flawed legisla-
tive framing, the complexity of Dodd–Frank, and the glacial pace of im-
plementation enable the very defects in the financial sector regulation 
that legislators seek to remedy. The Volcker Rule, which restricts propri-
etorial trading, is an obvious example.
21
 A clear rule has transmogrified 
into a complex implementation process, informed by waves of excep-
tions that undercut legislative intent and undermine regulatory authority. 
Likewise, the deception at the heart of the multifaceted Libor scandal 
points to patterns of conduct that have institutionalized inefficient and 
unfair markets, a diametrically opposed outcome to that envisaged in 
market conduct legislation. As such, on both a descriptive and analytical 
level, within both individual entities and the broader regulatory “re-
gime,”22 the entire regulatory process represents what Lawrence Lessig 
has termed a form of “institutional corruption”—that is, it “describes an 
influence, financial or otherwise, within an economy of influence, that 
weakens the effectiveness of an institution, especially by weakening pub-
lic trust in that institution.”23 
                                                                                                                            
in which corporate activity moves from “(1) immorality; (2) reactivity; (3) compliance; (4) integrity; 
(5) total alignment”); see also Donald W. Light, Strengthening the Theory of Institutional Corrup-
tions: Broadening, Clarifying, and Measuring (Edmond J. Safra Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 2, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236391. 
 21. Gregg Fields, Reformers at Bay: Analyzing Institutional Failure in the Implementation of 
Dodd–Frank, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/ 
lab/blog/256-reformers-at-bay. Daniel Tarullo of the Federal Reserve has noted that the problem of 
articulating the final rule is exacerbated by the number of regulatory agencies involved: “We have 
basically five different agencies involved, we have 22 separate individuals, each of whom has a vote, 
none of whom works for anyone but themselves. This is a matter of taking some time to take every-
one’s interest into account, to develop enough of a consensus that we can move forward.” Darrell 
Delamaide, Volcker Rule Delay Shows Financial Reform’s Flaws, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2013, 7:12 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/04/10/delamaide-column-volcker-rule/2 
070951/. For an international approach favoring elevation of broad principles over protracted rule-
making, see Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Fin. Stability, Speech Delivered at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th Economic Policy Symposium: The Changing Policy Landscape, 
The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publica 
tions/Documents/speeches/2012/speech596.pdf. 
 22. CHRISTOPHER HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK 9 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) 
(describing a regulatory regime as a “complex of institutional [physical and social] geography, rules, 
practice and animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of a particular risk or hazard”). 
 23. Lawrence Lessig, Dir., Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Speech Delivered at the Edmond J. 
Safra Center for Ethics, Institutional Corruption (Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=0-lEDiUFXUk. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY 
CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011). The evolving definition is discussed in 
Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruptions (Edmond J. Safra Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 1, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233582. For analysis of 
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Credible, ongoing reform must demonstrate that the dangers of in-
stitutional corruption have been addressed. Approved standing by a regu-
latory agency is no longer sufficient bulwark to ethical commitment, a 
fact explicitly acknowledged by the Parliamentary Commission on Bank-
ing Standards.
24
 This criticism of regulatory effectiveness can be trans-
cended, however, if one recalls the original emphasis of the disclosure 
paradigm—the quintessential tool in market conduct regulation. In its 
initial framing, disclosure did not rest on technicalities that can be trans-
acted around. At its core, it is a normative demand, a point explicitly 
made by its designers as they crisscrossed the United States in a battle 
over the legitimacy of the reform process.
25
 Demanding truth in securi-
ties is, in essence, a moral claim. Seen from this perspective, what is re-
quired is not the retirement of the paradigm but, rather, its rejuvenation. 
This paper, therefore, explores how the ethical deficit in the financial 
industry can be addressed by revisiting the debates that accompanied the 
passage of the New Deal architecture. 
                                                                                                                            
interaction between legislative design and regulatory policy, see FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR 
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 157 (1997) (characterizing 
politicians “not as mere brokers redistributing wealth in response to competing private demands, but 
as independent actors making their own demands to which private actors respond”). 
 24. It is indicative that Sir James Crosby, the former chief executive of HBOS who stewarded 
the bank to the brink of collapse before its bailout in 2008, received a knighthood for his services to 
the financial industry and served as Deputy Chairman of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
following his departure from the bank, until forced to resign in 2009. See PARL. COMM’N ON 
BANKING STANDARDS, ‘AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN’: THE FAILURE OF HBOS, 2012–13, 
H.L. 144, at 52 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/ 
jtpcbs/144/144.pdf.  
In the view of this Commission, it is right and proper that the primary responsibility for 
the downfall of HBOS should rest with Sir James Crosby, architect of the strategy that set 
the course for disaster, with Andy Hornby [his successor as Chief Executive Officer], 
who proved unable or unwilling to change course, and Lord Stevenson [the Chairman], 
who presided over the bank’s board from its birth to its death. Lord Stevenson, in particu-
lar, has shown himself incapable of facing the realities of what placed the bank in jeop-
ardy from that time until now. Apart from allowing their Approved Persons status at 
HBOS to lapse as their posts were wound up, the FSA appears to have taken no steps to 
establish whether they are fit and proper persons to hold Approved Persons status else-
where in the UK financial sector. In cases of this importance the Commission believes 
that simply allowing Approved Persons status to lapse is insufficient. The Commission 
therefore considers that the FSA should examine, as part of its forthcoming review of the 
failure of HBOS, whether these three individuals should be barred from undertaking any 
role in the financial sector. 
Id. at 42–43. 
 25. Baldwin B. Bane, Chief, Sec. Div. of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on the Securities Act of 1933 (Sept. 19, 
1933), reprinted in THE CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 587, 592 (1933). 
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The New Deal remains the paradigmatic and most sophisticated ho-
listic attempt to shift cultural mores by imposing external restraints on 
capital market governance. As with the contemporary manifestation of 
financial crisis, the New Deal architects were forced to confront ques-
tions associated with opacity and complexity in the design and marketing 
of financial products: how to embed restraint, and how to define and lim-
it systemic risk. Despite the similarities in terms of scale and societal 
impact, there is one fundamental difference. In sharp contrast to the 
piecemeal reforms of today, the New Deal was based on a fundamental 
rethinking of corporate and regulatory purposes. Disentangling the idea-
tional roots of these disputes, then and now, provides critical evidence as 
to why the New Deal was so transformational and why Libor and associ-
ated reform of too big to fail, shadow banking, and the derivatives mar-
ket has, to date, proved so ineffective. 
The vehicle to achieve this is a reappraisal of James M. Landis. An 
outstanding theoretician and practitioner of regulatory design, he was 
primarily responsible for the design and implementation of the disclosure 
paradigm.
26
 Reaching into the history of market conduct is far from an 
esoteric exercise. It is critical to understanding current problems in the 
fields of public administration and socio-legal approaches to regulation 
in general. As Lambright and Quinn have highlighted,  
[B]etter understanding of the practice of administrative leadership 
advances theory. Application of theory by those in positions of au-
thority raises the level of practice. Reading about leaders who truly 
make a difference for others can inspire, teach, and help attract the 
best and brightest of a new generation to public service.
27
  
Indeed, it is an approach favored by Landis himself, as he pondered a 
return to Harvard after establishing and then leading the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.
28
 
                                                        
 26. John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Globalisation of Corporate Regulation and Corporate 
Citizenship, 3 FLINDERS J. L. REFORM 33, 56 (1999), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE 
LAW ANNUAL 3, 25–26 (Fiona MacMillan ed., Hart Publ’g 2003) (describing Landis as a seminal 
scholar of regulatory strategy). 
 27. W. Henry Lambright & Madison M. Quinn, Understanding Leadership in Public Admin-
istration: The Biographical Approach, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 782, 788 (2011). 
 28. James M. Landis, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Address Before the Third Annu-
al Eastern Law Students Conference at the Catholic University of America School of Law 1 (Mar. 
20, 1937), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1937/ 032037landis.pdf. (“One grasps for 
shadow, the better to comprehend sunlight. One reaches into the past, more clearly to know today 
and tomorrow. It is the privilege of all who care about education to test the depth and quality of that 
shadow, for there, perhaps more than anywhere, one must try to pierce the brilliance of continuing 
dawns.”). 
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This paper is structured as follows. Part II examines the critical im-
portance of Landis’s work in providing practical and theoretical justifica-
tion for state intervention in the regulation of securities markets. The re-
view draws on a series of interviews Landis provided to the Columbia 
University Oral History Project.
29
 Personal papers deposited with the 
Harvard Law School and Harvard University Archives, made available to 
scholars for the first time in January 2013, provide additional context that 
enrich our understanding of both the initial debates and their contempo-
rary relevance. Part III details the extent of the corruption uncovered by 
the Libor investigation. Part IV sets out concrete steps capable of chang-
ing banking culture by revisiting the strategies initially used by Landis as 
both a practitioner and theoretician of regulatory policy. It is argued that 
revitalizing this approach provides the basis to restore much needed con-
fidence in market conduct and in regulatory authority. Part V concludes. 
II. JAMES M. LANDIS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
An appreciation in the Harvard Law Review on his death in 1964 
noted that James M. Landis was “‘on fire’ as a student. This may well be 
taken to epitomize his career.”30 Landis was to become a critical architect 
of the Securities Act (1933), which governed new issuance, and the Se-
curities Exchange Act (1934), which extended regulatory oversight to 
existing securities, demanded regular financial reporting, and mandated 
associational governance through the establishment of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).
31
 He served on the SEC’s inaugural 
board, becoming its chair following the departure of Joseph Kennedy in 
1934, with the public endorsement of his predecessor.
32
 As Joseph Ken-
                                                        
 29. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE REMINISCENCES OF JAMES M. LANDIS (Oral History Collection, 
Columbia Univ. 1964). 
 30. Erwin N. Griswold, James McCauley Landis—1899–1964, 78 HARV. L. REV. 313, 313 
(1964). “Surely a man who has done so much should be judged by the best that he can do; and Lan-
dis at his best was a great lawyer and legal scholar.” Id. at 316. 
 31. For biographies of Landis, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984) 
and DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980). On his death in 
July 1964, the New York Times noted he “achieved the rare distinction of being regarded as a con-
servative by liberals and as an extreme liberal by conservatives.” See James M. Landis Found Dead 
in Swimming Pool at His Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1964, at 1. For institutional history of the 
SEC, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed. 2003). 
 32. Landis Heads SEC; Succeeds Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1935, at 35 (quoting Kenne-
dy saying: “I see no reason in the world why any business interests need have the slightest misgiving 
that he will not give them the fairest and squarest deal a man can get. I would deem it an honor to 
have him as a trustee of anything I owned. He is thoroughly cognizant of the importance of the suc-
cessful administration of these acts in helping to revive the business of the country”). It was to be a 
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nedy left the SEC headquarters, he interrupted Landis’s first press con-
ference by calling out, “Good-bye Jim. Good luck to you. Knock ‘em 
over.”33 Landis authored an influential thesis on regulatory rulemaking, 
legitimacy, and authority that retrospectively provided theoretical justifi-
cation for the proposition that law is made, not found.
34
 Two decades 
later, he prepared a seminal study for the President-elect, John F. Kenne-
dy, on how and why the regulatory apparatus he was so instrumental in 
designing, predicated on rule by experts, had failed.
35
 Notwithstanding 
the personal tragedy of Landis’s subsequent thirty-day imprisonment in 
August 1963 (commuted to hospitalization) and suspension from the 
New York Bar for failing to file income tax returns,
36
 the Columbia in-
                                                                                                                            
lifelong association. See DAVID NASAW, THE PATRIARCH: THE REMARKABLE LIFE AND TURBULENT 
TIMES OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY 769 (2012) (noting appointment of Landis as special advisor to Presi-
dent-elect John F. Kennedy in 1960 and articulating that, next to family, Joseph Kennedy “trusted no 
one to watch out for his son as he did Jim Landis”). 
 33. Landis Heads SEC; Succeeds Kennedy, supra note 32. The position allowed Landis to 
experiment with a regulatory design he had first articulated in 1931. Critical in this context was the 
decision on which “device for enforcement” is to be used. See James M. Landis, The Study of Legis-
lation at Law Schools: An Imaginary Inaugural Lecture, 39 HARV. GRADUATES MAG. 433 (1931).  
The criminal penalty, the civil penalty, the resort to the injunctive side of equity, the tri-
pling of damage claims, the informers’ share, the penalizing force of pure publicity, the 
license as a condition of pursuing certain conduct, the confiscation of offending proper-
ty—these are the samples of the thousand and one devices that the ingenuity of many leg-
islatures has produced. Their effectiveness to control one field and their ineffectiveness to 
control others, remains yet to be explored. 
Id. at 437. 
 34. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
 35. JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960), 
available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.co 
m/collection/papers/1960/1960_1221_Landis_report.pdf; see also LANDIS, supra note 29, at 638 
(“[R]outine business before these administrative agencies was much too heavy to permit them to do 
the broad kind of policymaking that was essential. They didn’t have the power to delegate enough of 
their duties, so that they could keep, in a sense, their desks clean and their minds free to think about 
the major problems they faced.”). The arguments foreshadowed many made by regulatory capture 
theorists. See George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964). 
For review, see Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in 
the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139 (2001). 
 36. Following an investigation by the Department of Justice, he was charged and sentenced to 
one month in prison and commuted to hospitalization. Edward Ranzal, Landis Jailed for Tax Delays, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1963. He was subsequently suspended from practice. It was an ignominious 
end to an illustrious career. The most complete account to date can be found in VICTOR S. NAVASKY, 
KENNEDY JUSTICE 427–40 (1971); see also NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, SOME OF IT WAS FUN: 
WORKING WITH RFK AND LBJ (2008). In a promotional interview for the book, Katzenbach, who 
was the Deputy Attorney General at the time of the Landis prosecution, described it as something 
that had to be done (of which, he argued, Landis himself was aware and accepted) but that “did not 
amount to a row of beans.” Interview by GOVERNINGworks with Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, for-
mer U.S. Att’y Gen. (Nov. 23, 2010), available at http://bigthink.com/users/nicholaskatzenbach#! 
video_idea_id=5612. Katzenbach’s video account, much more forceful and remorseful than the 
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terviews—read in conjunction with the recently released Harvard materi-
al, contemporary scholarly debates, and media interventions— provide a 
treasure trove that helps illuminate the past and provide a navigational 
aid to contemporary problems.
37
 
This material makes clear that in design and application, the norma-
tive question of why one regulates trumps the technical considerations of 
                                                                                                                            
written version, is predicated on the belief that politics can and does result in brutal outcomes. The 
political calculation is contained in a secret recording made by John F. Kennedy of a conversation 
with Katzenbach immediately prior to the admission of guilt: 
JFK: If anybody ever gets the idea that the president’s friends can get away with 
it . . . gosh I think it would be an awful morale cracker to the internal revenue, uh to tax-
payers, the next time that anyone got arrested they’d say well what the hell about Landis? 
 
NDK: That’s right. That’s right. I’m afraid that’s right. But I don’t think . . . I think we’d 
take it into court and it could done quickly . . . and . . . . 
 
JFK: How quickly and quietly could it be done? 
 
NDK: It can’t be done absolutely quietly but I think that if Dean [William] Warren [of 
Columbia Law School], who’s his counsel, would cooperate, I think we could get it all 
over with maybe in one session. 
Telephone Recordings: Dictation Belt 23D.5. James M. Landis and the IRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY 
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (July 25, 1963), http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-TPH-23D-5.aspx. A deal was struck pursuant to which Landis would 
plead guilty, but the sentencing judge recused himself and was replaced by Chief Justice Sylvester 
Ryan. Katzenbach described imprisonment as an exercise in “judicial ego.” See KATZENBACH, su-
pra, at 102. This claim was rejected by Chief Justice Ryan, who in 1981, maintained the verdict was 
fair, not cruel. 
Cruel. What was so cruel? Here is a man who has enjoyed every advantage life can offer; 
while poor Irish and Jewish and Italian and colored kids were clawing their way out of 
the gutter, this guy was getting every break. Now, when he has been caught, the Govern-
ment slobbers over him, the Dean of Columbia Law [William Warren] slobbers over him 
and everybody in the courthouse is falling over himself to make it easy for him. I had to 
do my duty and my duty was to show that Landis was no better than anyone else. 
Milton Gould, James M. Landis—Classic Case of Hubris, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 14, 1981) (quoting Chief 
Justice Ryan). This leaves unexplained the level of discrepancy as to why the initial judge recused 
himself. According to Navasky, it was based on a conflict arising from an association with Landis’s 
law partner, Justin Feldman. NAVASKY, supra, at 437. The real reason, however, is more problemat-
ic. In an interview with the author, the prosecutor in the case, Robert Morgenthau, maintained the 
case was a tragedy of Greek proportions, with Landis’s fate sealed when Thomas Corcoran, an ex-
ceptionally senior lawyer and close confidante of Oliver Wendell Holmes (for whom he clerked), 
Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson, went to the sentencing judge after the initial hearing to argue 
that the administration expected leniency. Chief Justice Ryan was informed of Corcoran’s deliberate 
and inexcusable attempt to influence the outcome of the case. The Chief Justice, already personally 
slighted because the Kennedy Administration had previously passed him over for a vacancy in the 
Court of Appeals, was furious and determined to send a clear message to the administration. Inter-
view with Robert Morganthau, former U.S. Att’y, S. Dist. N.Y., in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 25, 2013). 
A full account is forthcoming in JUSTIN O’BRIEN, A LIFE ON FIRE: THE TRIUMPH, TRAGEDY AND 
LOST LEGACY OF JAMES M. LANDIS (forthcoming 2014). 
 37. See, e.g., Landis Retiring, Reviews SEC Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1937, at 33. 
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how one regulates. The critical argument advanced here is that unless this 
lost dimension is restored, regulatory intervention will be incapable of 
changing practice. Once again, progressing the regulatory agenda neces-
sitates a deep awareness of the lessons of history. In this section we do so 
through a three-stage process: first, we trace the rationale for interven-
tion; second, we detail the explicit normative foundation of the under-
pinning legislation; and third, we evaluate the basis on which this was 
theoretically justified. 
A. The Rationale for Intervention in Capital Markets 
For the progenitors of the original administrative state, the aim was 
not to operate within accepted paradigms—legal, institutional, and theo-
retical—but to destabilize them by creating an alternative reality, one 
that legitimated state intervention. Extending far beyond the narrow 
realm of banking and securities regulation, the New Deal was designed 
to recalibrate society itself through the guidance of neutral experts. The 
scale of the ambition, as outlined in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech ac-
cepting the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1932, remains 
as breathtaking in its audacity as it is eerily apposite to contemporary 
problems in financial services: 
Out of every crisis, every tribulation, every disaster, mankind rises 
with some share of greater knowledge, of higher decency, of purer 
purpose. Today we shall have come through a period of loose think-
ing, descending morals, an era of selfishness, among individual men 
and women and among Nations. Blame not Governments alone for 
this. Blame ourselves in equal share. Let us be frank in acknowl-
edgment of the truth that many amongst us have made obeisance to 
Mammon, that the profits of speculation, the easy road without toil, 
have lured us from the old barricades. To return to higher standards 
we must abandon the false prophets and seek new leaders of our 
own choosing.
38
 
                                                        
 38. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Democratic 
National Convention in Chicago, Illinois (July 2, 1932). The rhetoric intensified by the time of the 
inauguration: 
The moneychangers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We 
may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure of the restoration lies in 
the extent to which we apply social values more noble than mere monetary prof-
it. . . . [T]here must be an end to a conduct in banking and in business which too often has 
given to a sacred trust the likeness of callous and selfish wrongdoing. Small wonder that 
confidence languishes, for it thrives only on honesty, on honor, on the sacredness of obli-
gations, on faithful protection, on unselfish performance; without them it cannot live. 
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The New Deal engendered debates that were as much political as 
judicial, practical as theoretical. They took place in the context of domes-
tic industrial and financial failure and looming conflagration in Europe: 
the rise of the Soviet Union, the emergence of Fascism in Italy, and Na-
zism in Germany. Experience, experiment, and avowed faith in the rule 
of experts to solve the complexities of modern society underpinned a 
powerful interdisciplinary intellectual movement. Given the opportunity 
to simultaneously translate theory into practice and generate theory from 
practice, the crisis also revealed significant conceptual shortcomings in 
prior policy design. 
The power to effect change was exponentially increased by the 
temporary fracturing of previously powerful electoral and ideational coa-
litions.
39
 In the legal realm, it was informed by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s pithy comment that “the life of law has not been logic; it has 
been experience.”40 As with their economic counterparts, legal realists 
and pragmatists used the institutions created by the New Deal as a labor-
atory to explore how an alliance between government and business could 
best institutionalize restraint. The critical objective was not, however, the 
overthrow of capitalism or the financial system but rather credible, ongo-
ing, and sustainable reform in which a regulatory authority could guide a 
                                                                                                                            
Restoration calls, however, not for changes in ethics alone. This Nation asks for action, 
and action now. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, Inaugural Address in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 4, 1933). 
 39. Academics played a critical role in this process, most notably Adolf A. Berle at Columbia 
University. Scholars have noted Berle’s 1931 recruitment as a founding member of then-Governor 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Brains Trust. See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND 
THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 70–75 (1987). Harvard University was also a critical source of 
ideas on the shaping of regulatory purpose; in particular, Felix Frankfurter was irritated by the de-
gree to which Berle influenced economic policy. JAMES SRODES, ON DUPONT CIRCLE: FRANKLIN 
AND ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVES WHO SHAPED OUR WORLD 198 (2012). It is 
indicative of Frankfurter’s standing that his elevation to the Supreme Court could be deemed a de-
motion. See Matthew Josephson, Jurist—I, NEW YORKER, Nov. 30, 1940. For Landis’s criticism of 
Berle as too cautious, see LANDIS, supra note 29, at 237 (noting Berle’s caution in relation to the 
establishment of the SEC, Landis recalled that “it was perfectly honest on the part of Berle, no ques-
tion about that. It would not be fair to accuse him of trying to favor the other side. That would be the 
wrong way of looking at it. But the approach was that of gradualism, not jumping in headlong.”). 
 40. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). For Holmes, “state interference 
is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good.” Id. at 89. Holmes provided a signed copy to the 
British social scientist Harold Laski, who returned it via diplomatic pouch to Landis, then-Dean of 
Harvard Law School, for safekeeping. “What worries me is the irreplaceable loss that will occur if 
men lose the vision of liberty that alone has been the moving force to bring about the idea of civili-
zation. To speak freely, to write freely and to think freely—give us these and we can rebuild our 
libraries; but if those liberties are destroyed, libraries are but recitals of a dead past which may not be 
inquired into.” Letter from James M. Landis to Harold Laski (Oct. 28, 1940) (on file with Harvard 
University Archive, Dean’s Office UAV.512.20: 1940–47, Correspondence Box 15). 
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given industry as a whole towards socially beneficial outcomes. As ex-
pected, it also prompted concern that democracy itself could be threat-
ened.
41
 Roosevelt needed critical intellectual support in this battle of ide-
as, and it was no surprise that he turned to James M. Landis. 
Landis was the critical figure in the academic and policy debates 
over the rise and justification for the administrative process.
42
 He was 
steeped in it as both an academic and a policymaker. As early as 1930, he 
had dismissed any restrictions on agency discretion as little more than an 
attempt to curtail the legitimate exercise of public power for the public 
good.
43
 At the asking of his long-term confidant, professor Felix Frank-
furter, to help the Roosevelt Administration transform an initial 1932 
election pledge to regulate securities into credible legislation, Landis be-
gan a commute from Cambridge to Washington that was to transform the 
governance of Wall Street and American society through the auspices 
and example of the SEC. 
Putting into practice the ideas developed in his innovative course on 
legislation at Harvard, he became one of the most significant policy ac-
tors of his generation (and arguably in the history of regulatory design). 
Landis stewarded the agency through early legitimacy and accountability 
firefights with the financial sector, showing as much acumen in navi-
gating the complexity of political contingency and judicial gamesman-
                                                        
 41. These pressures intensified as the United States made preparations for entry into World 
War II, fracturing old alliances in the process. Typical, for example, was an exchange between Sena-
tor Burton Wheeler and Landis: “I am quite frank in saying to you, that I cannot understand how any 
intelligent person, including yourself, can possibly be for giving these wide powers to the Presi-
dent. . . . For College professors and Dean’s [sic] to [be] taking steps that will inevitably lead to 
totalitarianism in the name of saving Democracy indicates to me that our republican form of Gov-
ernment is on the way out. If they have not the courage to stand up and try to preserve Democracy in 
times of a crisis, or an alleged crisis, how can they expect the uneducated to do so.” Letter from 
Burton Wheeler to James Landis (Feb. 4, 1941) (on file with Harvard University Archive, Dean’s 
Office UAV.512.20: 1940–47, Correspondence Box 24). For a discussion of competing ideational 
perspectives, see IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES 
29–57 (2013). 
 42. Landis “persistently emphasized the necessity of using all the incentives potentially inher-
ent in the industry to give every person involved—executive, accountant, broker, banker—a stake in 
helping to enforce the law.” MCCRAW, supra note 31, at 172. Landis gave an explicit justification of 
associational endeavors, noting that increased complexity calls “for greater surveillance by govern-
ment of the appropriate use of these resources to further the admittedly dim but recognizable aims of 
our society.” LANDIS, supra note 34, at 4; see also Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 26, at 56 (not-
ing the “regulatory genius” of the partnership model). 
 43. James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); for 
a critique of Landis’s approach, see Ronald J. Pestritto, The Progressive Origins of the Administra-
tive State: Wilson, Goodnow, and Landis, 24 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 16, 26–37 (2007). 
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ship as in legislative drafting.
44
 Although the enforcement methods used 
by the SEC had come under attack from a Supreme Court and a legal 
profession deeply troubled by the expansion of the administrative rule, 
the agency had been deemed constitutional, if potentially dangerous. In 
Jones v. SEC, a case that ostensibly centered on subpoena power over 
withdrawn securities offerings, the Supreme Court had publicly ques-
tioned the methods used by the SEC. Justice Sutherland noted that its 
demands were both wholly arbitrary and unreasonable, invoking by anal-
ogy the notorious Star Chamber. 
Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution cannot both exist. 
They are antagonistic and incompatible forces; and one or the other 
must of necessity perish whenever they are brought into con-
flict. . . . Our institutions must be kept free from the appropriation of 
unauthorized power by lesser agencies as well. And if the various 
administrative bureaus and commissions, necessarily called and be-
ing called into existence by the increasing complexities of our mod-
ern business and political affairs, are permitted gradually to extend 
their powers by encroachments—even petty encroachments—upon 
the fundamental rights, privileges and immunities of the people, we 
shall in the end, while avoiding the fatal consequences of a supreme 
autocracy, become submerged by a multitude of minor invasions of 
personal rights, less destructive but no less violative of constitution-
al guaranties.
45
 
Tracing the rationale from the initial framing of the Securities Act 
(1933) and Securities Exchange Act (1934) to the publication of The 
Administrative Process (1938) indicates the centrality of specifying regu-
latory purpose. Specificity was essential in legitimizing a new approach 
                                                        
 44. JAMES BURK, VALUES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE AMERICAN STOCK MARKET UNDER 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 43 (1988). 
 45. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1936). Dissenting, Justice Cardozo noted: 
[A] commission which is without coercive powers, which cannot arrest or amerce or im-
prison though a crime has been uncovered, or even punish for contempt, but can only in-
quire and report, the propriety of every question in the course of the inquiry being subject 
to the supervision of the ordinary courts of justice, is likened with denunciatory fervor to 
the Star Chamber of the Stuarts. Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile. 
Id. at 33 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Correspondence between Felix Frankfurter and Supreme Court 
Justice Harlan Stone revealed profound skepticism with this reasoning. According to Frankfurter, 
“Sutherland writes as though he were still a United States senator, making partisan speech.” Chief 
Justice Stone was even more caustic in reply; the judgment, he maintained, “was written for morons, 
and such will no doubt take comfort from it.” Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The 
Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1608 (2011) 
(quoting an exchange of letters dated April 7, 1936, on file with Harvard Law School Special Collec-
tions Library). 
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to governance. It was predicated on a dual interlocking framework. First, 
it limited the grounds for judicial challenge on constitutionality grounds. 
Second, it limited suspicion of the exercise of arbitrary power. Rules and 
decisions would only be developed on the basis of rigorous evaluation. 
Within this framework, the specific forms of disclosure were designed to 
inform the investing public of actual practice. So doing, it was argued, 
made it possible to incrementally change the boundaries of what could be 
considered as acceptable in any given market. The entire approach was 
predicated on industry’s acceptance of responsibility for past excesses 
and a concomitant mindfulness in the exercise of leadership in the after-
math of the exposure of past deficiencies. Within this context, the abid-
ing strength (and limitations) of the Landis approach to governance be-
comes clear. 
The combination of elite wisdom and capacity to both capture and 
utilize populist sentiment to nudge discourse and practice necessitates 
demonstrable evidence of judgment, courage, and integrity. At the heart 
of the compromise lies an uneasy compact on how to evaluate such ex-
pertise. In the initial framing, this was conceived as the remit of impartial 
career-driven bureaucrats, prepared to forgo personal material advance-
ment in exchange for societal improvement. This conception’s critical 
flaw, however, is exposed when claims to expertise are evaluated accord-
ing to different normative criteria. This shift and implications for regula-
tory design, legitimacy, and authority are explored more fully below. 
First, however, it is essential to highlight the ingenuity of the design. 
B. The Normative Foundations of the Disclosure Paradigm 
Primary responsibility for the 1932 electoral promise to introduce 
securities regulation was initially given to Houston Thompson, a former 
Federal Trade Commissioner, whose carriage of it was, according to 
Landis, “a complete debacle.”46 The problem was that rather than im-
plementing “what Mr. Roosevelt had set forth in his message [in his elec-
toral pledge, Thompson] sought to introduce a standard of qualification.” 
As Landis observed, “[B]y qualification I mean that some federal agency 
would determine whether securities themselves, no matter how truthfully 
they might be described, could nevertheless not be sold on the basis that 
                                                        
 46. LANDIS, supra note 29, at 158. 
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they didn’t meet certain standards of qualification. These standards were 
never well described.”47 
For Landis, such an approach—based on the very predilections and 
bias he identified in the decisions of the Supreme Court from Lochner 
onwards—was doomed to fail. Poor drafting and excessive deference 
combined to make the approach unworkable. Landis reasoned, 
It was a terribly poorly drafted piece of legislation. In the first place 
it didn’t carry out the President’s ideas. In the second place, it intro-
duced sanctions and responsibilities on the federal government for 
the quality of securities that were being sold, which even today 
[1963] I don’t believe the federal government and I don’t believe 
even a state agency ought to exercise.
48
  
This reasoning represented a clear limit to what regulators should do. As 
Landis explained it, 
[M]y fundamental belief is that if the truth is told about these things, 
then it is up to the parties to decide whether they want to buy them 
or not. If they want to buy them, and speculate, well, let them go 
ahead and speculate. I’ve always felt that the furthest that practical 
administration could go was to call for a statement of the truth about 
any enterprise; but that some governmental agency should say you 
shouldn’t buy stock in ABC company—I don’t know who can de-
cide a thing like that.
49
  
                                                        
 47. Id. at 157. “Brandeis said to me, ‘Houston Thompson has every great quality that makes a 
great lawyer, except one. He’s got a great bearing, he’s got a good presence.’ I said, ‘What quality 
does he lack, Mr. Justice?’ Brandeis replied, ‘Brains.’” Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 158. It was a formulation that was to stand the test of time. “A fundamental purpose, 
common to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of 
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” SEC 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). This necessitates, however, bal-
ancing valid and spurious claims. See O’BRIEN, supra note 5, at 66–67 (citing Judge Milton Pol-
lack’s argument that the federal securities laws are not meant “to underwrite, subsidize and encour-
age . . . rash speculation in joining a free-wheeling casino that lured thousands obsessed with the 
fantasy of Olympian riches but which delivered such riches to only a scant handful of lucky win-
ners.” In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Increasingly, howev-
er, there are suggestions that the SEC should be given the power to ban either specific products or 
access to them. See Saule T. Omarova, From Reaction to Prevention: Product Approval As a Model 
of Derivatives Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV 98 (2013), available at http://www.hblr.org/?p 
=3111; see also Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 113–33 (2012). For comparative review of how this is achieved 
with pharmaceutical products, see DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010). 
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None of this is to suggest that Landis was in any way either enamored by 
or trustful of Wall Street; rather, his strategy was based on explicit en-
rollment and a sustained attempt to leverage the restraining power of 
reputation, a commodity that had been devalued by certain sections and 
practices of the financial industry. Reliance on truth and reputation were 
narrower and more easily communicable frameworks. In conjunction 
with Benjamin Cohen, another Frankfurter connection, and assisted by 
Tommy Corcoran, a Wall Street veteran, brilliant academician, and con-
summate lobbyist, the trio “knocked this thing out in two days.”50 “This 
thing” was to be the initial draft for the Securities Act (1933), on which 
Cohen and Landis were to serve as consultants under the direction of the 
legislative draftsman of the House of Representatives, Middleton 
Beaman. Landis’s taped interviews provide a revealing insight into how 
the process unfolded: 
For two days, Beaman wouldn’t allow you to put a pencil to paper. 
He wanted you to know just exactly what you wanted to do, before 
you started writing. I know that both Cohen and I were a little sus-
picious of him, as to whether he didn’t want to kill this whole thing, 
with all these dilatory tactics. But within four or five days, we be-
gan to appreciate his work and his method of approach. I guess we 
worked for three or four weeks perfecting the draft, and with his 
help . . . we put this thing together. In my opinion and the opinions 
of a great many other people, it’s about as good a piece of legisla-
tive draftsmanship as you can find in federal legislation.
51
 
Soon after the law was enacted, Landis was called upon to return to 
Washington as a consultant to the Federal Trade Commission, where he 
found the agency “had no conception about how to administer this 
Act. . . . They had no sympathy with this legislation. It was pretty much 
dammed by Wall Street and regarded as one of these crackpot New Deal 
measures.”52 Subsequently promoted to commissioner, Landis recalled 
an early meeting with Roosevelt, during which the President recounted 
that “the Republicans never want to do anything, so they’re always unit-
ed. But we Democrats want to do things, and we get disunited in wanting 
to do things.”53 Thereafter, according to Landis, he assumed leadership: 
“I didn’t bother him. I mean I assumed the responsibility of deciding 
                                                        
 50. LANDIS, supra note 29, at 160. 
 51. Id. at 162–63. 
 52. Id. at 173. 
 53. Id. at 178. 
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things that I felt I had the right to decide.”54 As Landis recounts the histo-
ry of the passage of the Securities Exchange Act (1934), the extent of 
that delegation becomes clear. Along with Ferdinand Pecora, whose con-
gressional investigations had created the contingency for fulfilling elec-
toral pledges in relation to regulating securities, separating investment 
and commercial banking, and replacing caveat emptor with a disclosure 
philosophy,
55
 Landis was invited to the White House: 
Roosevelt met us—well he was in bed when he interviewed us, 
gave us an interview. He had stacks of papers around him, I know. I 
recall that. Well Ferdi didn’t know anything about the Boss. Great 
investigator the guy was, really a great investigator, but from the 
standpoint of a creative artist, he just didn’t have that quality. Of 
course, we built on his work. We built completely on his work. But 
he just doesn’t have that quality of putting together the work in the 
form of draft legislation. But we both went up to him, to see the 
President and the President asked a few questions about the bill. I 
don’t think we spent more than 20 or 30 minutes. We covered this, 
we covered that—quite intelligent questions—and he hadn’t read 
the bill. Then he said, ‘All right. Go ahead.’
56
 
Landis was always alert to the possibility that congressional 
amendments were in fact traps for the unwary. For example, proposed 
amendments in the Senate to the corporate “death sentence” provision of 
the Public Utility Holding Company legislation were ostensibly designed 
to provide the SEC additional discretion on whether to exercise that 
power. For Landis, however, the reforms would have made it “complete-
ly impossible for any commission to administer a statute of that nature 
because the pressures on the commission should be insufferable. Physical 
standards such as were proposed—that was capable of administration. 
But to draw a distinction between good and bad holding companies 
                                                        
 54. Id. at 187. For Landis it was only through experimentation that effective policy could be 
implemented. In a 1937 speech in Philadelphia, he argued, “[B]roadly speaking[,] the problems of 
legislation and administration divide themselves into two phases. The first relates to the determina-
tion of what policies to pursue; the second to the discovery of how to make the chosen policies effec-
tive.” MCCRAW, supra note 31, at 202. 
 55. MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND PECORA’S 
INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE 292–94 (2011) 
(noting how the Securities Exchange Act had finally put a cop on Wall Street). 
 56. LANDIS, supra note 29, at 199. This freedom to act is a constant refrain in the reminis-
cences. Recalling another meeting, Landis noted, “[H]e might not have helped you at all. He might 
have just thrown the problem right back at you. The feeling of joviality that he gave you, the stimu-
lation and what not—then you’d go back and solve the damn problem yourself, without too much 
advice from the President.” Id. at 244. 
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seemed an impossible thing.”57 Again, here is evidence of good regulato-
ry design: clearly enunciated legislative power linked to equally clear 
objectives, and discretion only applied after careful and intensive scruti-
ny that was capable of surviving legal challenge. Throughout his career, 
Landis was determined to ensure flexibility without subjecting the agen-
cy to accusations of economic or ideological bias—a leitmotif that un-
derpins his book The Administrative Process (1938), the retrospective 
theoretical justification for what amounted to a new form of government. 
It remains the defining text of the field.
58
 An evaluation of its conceptual 
framing provides regulators and scholars with a roadmap for navigating 
the Libor and associated scandals, which are merely contemporary mani-
festations of long-standing problems. 
C. The Legitimacy of the Administrative Process 
As with The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), the 
classic Berle and Means treatise on the implications of the separation of 
ownership and control in major corporations, Landis’s book was de-
signed to inform an increasingly polarized debate over corporate purpose 
and responsibility.
59
 Its central premise and critical thrust was to position 
                                                        
 57. Id. at 217. 
 58. Landis dedicated The Administrative Process to Senator Sam Rayburn, the charismatic 
Democrat who facilitated the passage of the securities legislation. The gesture was greatly appreciat-
ed by the lawmaker. “It will remain of course one of my very prized possessions as my admiration of 
the author is as much as it should be for any man and to have you dedicate this volume to me is an 
honor that I will appreciate to my last day.” Letter from Senator Sam Rayburn to James M. Landis 
(Sept. 26, 1938) (on file with Harvard University Archive, Dean’s Office UAV.512.20: 1937–39, 
Correspondence Box 4). 
 59. Landis wrote to Professor Paul Sayre: “Some day I hope I can get time to really explore 
and extend some of the ideas that were there advanced in a rather tentative manner, or better, I hope 
that someone else will do it.” Letter from James M. Landis to Professor Paul Sayre, University of 
Iowa Law School (Feb. 14, 1939) (on file with Harvard University Archive, Dean’s Office 
UAV512.20: 1937–39, Correspondence Box 5). It is important to note, however, that notwithstand-
ing the intensity of the debate, there was acceptance from within the business world that Landis had 
generated an original third way: 
I have read with a great deal of interest and profit your lectures, [published as] The Ad-
ministrative Process. . . . Your explanation of the place in Government of commissions 
would go a long way towards eliminating some of the misunderstandings in regards to 
their functions. I am particularly impressed with the emphasis you develop as a basic 
principle underlying the Administrative Process to take care of and foster and develop the 
well being of the industry over which it has jurisdiction. . . . Investors cannot have much 
confidence in going into public utilities or other securities if they have the feeling, 
whether or not justified, that Government agencies are giving more attention to policing 
and punishing than to fostering. 
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regulatory lawmaking as an essential precondition for democracy.
60
 In a 
critical passage Landis argued, 
[I]f the doctrine of the separation of power implies division, it also 
implies balance, and balance calls for equality. The creation of ad-
ministrative power may be the means for that balance, so that para-
doxically enough, though it may seem in theoretic violation of the 
doctrine of the separation of power, it may in matter of fact be the 
means for the preservation of the content of that doctrine.
61
  
                                                                                                                            
Letter from Frank Scheffey, Co-Dir. of Investment Banking Conference, to James M. Landis (Jan. 
16, 1939) (on file with Harvard University Archive, Dean’s Office UAV512.20: 1937–39, Corre-
spondence Box 5). Landis replied on January 25, 1939: 
[T]he quarrel that I have with some of the administrative process is that many of the ad-
ministrators think of their duties purely in terms of police. A person of George Mathews’ 
[an original SEC commissioner] stamp was not only a sincere and courageous policeman, 
but he readily saw that to leave any permanent impress upon the industry something 
would have to be done to get into the inside of it as well as the outside. I only hope that 
the small efforts we participated in in this connection won’t go completely on the rocks. 
Letter from James M. Landis to Frank Scheffey (Jan. 25, 1939) (on file with Harvard University 
Archive, Dean’s Office UAV512.20: 1937–39, Correspondence S-Z Box 5). 
 60. For his critics, foremost among them his predecessor as Dean of Harvard Law School, 
Roscoe Pound, the rise of the administrative state was something to be feared. MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 219 
(1992). The political disagreements were matched by personal rivalries. Landis noted that “faculty 
politics is about as dirty politics as can evolve.” LANDIS, supra note 29, at 150–51. He also wrote: 
[I]t is curious how much the New Deal has been tied in with the development of adminis-
trative law and how frequently men who damn it are really doing so because they hate to 
see effective instrumentalities evolve to achieve the policies of the New Deal. Pound’s at-
tacks, for example, seem to me to have two prime sources: one of them is a Republican-
ism that saw no good in the rise of populism despite the scholarly mind that knew it was 
inevitable, and the second is an experience with the administration of prohibition. I often 
tell my class that they have to discount my views on administrative law because they 
have been formulated as a result of contact with fairly high level commissions, but for the 
same reason they must discount Pound’s ideas because they have been fashioned out of 
experiences with prohibition agents, than which I suppose it would be difficult to get a 
lower class of administrative officials. 
Letter from James M. Landis to Walter Gellhorn, Columbia Law School (Feb. 22, 1946) (on file 
with Harvard University Archive, Dean’s Office UAV.512.20: 1940–47, Correspondence Box 11). 
 61. LANDIS, supra note 34, at 46. For contemporary review, see Chester Rorhlich, Business 
Administration and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1938 (noting support for Landis’s admonition that 
“governmental administration should be determined by needs rather than numerology”). Academic 
colleagues had noted that the book was, in fact, a manifesto. On the lectures that were to be pub-
lished as The Administrative Process, the Dean of Yale Law School, Charles Clark, wrote that “they 
state positively, with force and reasoned argument, what to date has been so generally said only by 
way of defense from attacks. I think they well might prove a Bible for the Washington departments.” 
Letter from Charles Clark, Dean of Yale Law School, to James M. Landis (Jan. 27, 1938) (on file 
with Harvard University Archive, Dean’s Office UAV.512.20: 1940–47, Correspondence Box 9). 
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Therefore, for Landis the rise of the administrative state was an exercise 
in modernization, legitimated by “the inadequacy of a simply tripartite 
form of government to deal with modern problems.”62 
Landis believed that legitimacy originated in how the initial grant 
of authority was framed. This grant must “specify not only the subject 
matter of the regulation but also the end which the regulation seeks to 
attain.”63 Once delegated, regulatory rulemaking, like law itself, was 
merely “an instrument, or a social institution, if you will for the ad-
vancement of the health of society as a whole.”64 According to legal his-
torian Jessica Wang, the formulation “reflected legal pragmatism’s view 
of law as a process and ongoing experiment, rather than a set body of 
rules.”65 Landis considered it a much more complete agenda. “The ex-
pansion of regulatory activity is, of course, the most outstanding charac-
teristic of the nature of twentieth century governmental development,” 
which is founded on the “creation rather than the restriction of liberties,” 
he wrote in 1939.
66
 
This framing was a critical response to a concerted campaign led by 
the American Bar Association to defenestrate the commissions.
67
 This 
campaign ended only with the passage of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (1946), which opened regulatory decision making to extensive judi-
cial review.
68
 By that stage, however, Landis had already faced an exis-
tential moment in handling the deportation hearing for Harry R. Bridges 
at Angel Island in San Francisco Bay, a hearing that tested and demon-
                                                        
 62. LANDIS, supra note 34, at 1; see also Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the 
Regulatory State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401 (2003). “The regulation of markets was a response to 
the dissatisfaction with litigation as a mechanism of social control of business.” Id. at 402. 
 63. LANDIS, supra note 34, at 51. 
 64. Jessica Wang, Imagining the Administrative State: Legal Pragmatism, Securities Regula-
tion, and New Deal Liberalism, 17 J. POL’Y HIST. 257, 264 (2005) (citing a letter sent by Landis to 
Harvard colleague Sidney Simpson on May 27, 1936). 
 65. Id. at 265. The following chairmen of the SEC, William O. Douglas and Jerome Frank 
(both of whom were academic lawyers), mirrored this approach, taking a much more aggressive 
view of enforcement. Wang underplays the extent to which Landis was constrained by initial legiti-
macy battles. Without clearing the space, it is unlikely that Douglas could have adopted his more 
aggressive approach. 
 66. James M. Landis, Law and the New Liberties, 4 MO. L. REV. 105, 106 (1939). 
 67. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE ABA REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 331–68 (1938). 
 68. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); see also HORWITZ, supra note 60, at 230–
33. 
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strated his integrity and the strength of the paradigm of administrative 
law.
69
 
Thus, the battle over the authority to intervene was fought and won 
as early as 1937. Ongoing deference to agency power has been recog-
nized in cases that date back to the 1940s, and it was definitively ruled 
upon in 1984 in the landmark Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. ruling.
70
 Judicial deference to agency interpreta-
tions was based on pragmatism. Courts would give deference to agency 
interpretations depending upon “the thoroughness evident in [the agen-
cy’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with ear-
lier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 
to persuade, if lacking power to control.”71 Additionally, courts looked to 
see if the agency opinion had “warrant in the record and a reasonable 
basis in law.”72 Accordingly, while some deference was accorded to 
agencies, the amount of deference varied considerably, based on the facts 
surrounding the interpretation.
73
 Chevron changed the basis for defer-
ence. It laid out a two-step process for determining the validity of an 
                                                        
 69. JAMES M. LANDIS, IN THE MATTER OF HARRY R. BRIDGES: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF THE TRIAL EXAMINER 133 (1939) (“That Bridges’ aims are energetically radical may be admit-
ted, but the proof fails to establish that the methods he seeks to employ to realize them are other than 
those that the framework of democratic and constitutional government permits.”). Charles Wyzinski 
wrote to Landis: 
Quite apart from the political and social factors[,] which made this case so important in 
the history of this country, this report is certain to become famous as an example of the 
administrative process as a whole. There is perhaps no task more difficult for a lawyer, or 
judge than to make an impartial statement of facts in a case where emotion runs high, 
perjury abounds and economic and social forces clash. But you have done it. And every 
citizen has reason to be grateful not merely for your labor, but more particularly for the 
sacrifice of your personal interests which the job involved. 
Letter from Charles Wyzinski to James M. Landis (Dec. 10, 1940) (on file with Harvard University 
Archive, Dean’s Office UAV.512.20: 1940–47, Correspondence Box 24); see also Letter from 
James M. Landis to Julius Smith (Feb. 8, 1940) (on file with Harvard University Archives, Dean’s 
Office UAV.512.20: 1940–47, Correspondence Box 21) (“I do not think that our Administrative 
agencies are best manned by men who do not believe in the content of the rights which it is their 
sworn duty to maintain. I make no claim—and I think that is clear from my writings—that officials 
of the Labor board, to take a specific example, should be partial to employees as against employers; 
I do claim that officials of the Labor Board should be zealous in their sworn duty to maintain the 
right to collective bargaining against unfair, labor practices. Yet it is the former you accuse me of, 
not the latter.”). 
 70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 71. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 72. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (citing Roches-
ter Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939)).  
 73. “The decision whether to grant deference depends on various attributes of the agency’s 
legal authority and functions and of the administrative interpretation at issue.” Colin S. Diver, Statu-
tory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 562 (1985). 
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agency’s statutory construction.74 First, if Congress’s intent in enacting a 
statute is clear, then the court must ensure that the agency has given ef-
fect to that unambiguously expressed intent.
75
 If, however, a statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, then a court must 
apply a second step, which is to ask whether the agency’s interpretation 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
76
 
In developing its two-step framework, the Court articulated three 
reasons to justify its decision to defer to the agency: implicit delega-
tion,
77
 agency expertise,
78
 and political accountability.
79
 First, with re-
spect to the “implicit delegation” rationale, the Court reasoned that with 
the power to administer a congressionally created program comes the 
power to formulate policy and make “rules to fill any gap left, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”80 When Congress explicitly leaves 
a gap for an agency to fill, the agency’s interpretation controls so long as 
it is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
81
 
When delegation is implicit, “a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by 
the administrator of an agency.”82 This interpretation effectively expand-
ed the powers of legitimate agency rulemaking. Second, while the Court 
had previously alluded to “agency expertise” in the decisions of Skid-
more and Hearst,
83
 in Chevron it clarified that “[j]udges are not experts,” 
at least not in these technical areas.
84
 Agency personnel are highly quali-
fied to make technical determinations and are charged with making these 
determinations.
85
 Regardless of whether Congress actually intended to 
delegate to the agency, it simply makes sense to defer to such expertise.
86
 
Third, the Court was of the view that the Executive, unlike the Judicial 
                                                        
 74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 843. 
 77. Id. at 844. 
 78. Id. at 865. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 843. 
 81. Id. at 843–44. 
 82. Id. at 844. 
 83. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137–38 (1944) (opining that the agency ad-
ministrator had “accumulated a considerable experience in the problems” that the agency faced); see 
also Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (commenting 
that administrators had the benefit of “[e]veryday experience in the administration of the statute,” 
which “gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships”). 
 84. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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Branch of government, is accountable to the public.
87
 It is therefore more 
appropriate for the political branch of the government to resolve conflict-
ing policies “in light of everyday realities.”88 In a pointed reference, the 
Court held that “[f]ederal judges, who have no constituency, have a duty 
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”89 The rea-
soning and logic mirrors the rationale first outlined by Landis in the 
maelstrom of the battle over the constitutionality of the administrative 
process, but it is a logic that the recent jurisprudence of the D.C. Circuit 
in particular appears to have disregarded. However, deference to regula-
tory authority is only half of the story. The other half is how the regulato-
ry agency deploys that deference. 
The exercise of regulatory power has a large impact on the extent to 
which the agency enjoys bipartisan political or broader community sup-
port. This is determined in part by the performance of the market and in 
part by the accountability of the agency. Here again, revisiting Landis’s 
thought and practice on regulatory design pays dividends, most notably 
his work as a hearing examiner in 1940 in which he faced an existential 
choice between bowing to populism or demonstrating the efficacy of in-
dependence, based on integrity and evidence.
90
 The manner in which 
                                                        
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 865–66. 
 89. Id. at 866. However, the recent activism of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia against SEC rulemaking questions the stability of this framework: 
By substituting its own policy judgment for that of Congress, the D.C. Circuit threatens 
not just the ability of administrative agencies to formulate regulatory policy, but also the 
ability of Congress to direct agency policymaking. Explicit congressional determinations 
regarding regulatory policy warrant greater judicial deference than the courts have given 
to them. 
Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 698 (2013). 
 90. This was explicitly recognized by the two men who helped draft the original framework—
Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran. See, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Cohen to James M. Landis 
(Jan. 18, 1940) (on file with Harvard University Archive, Dean’s Subject Files, UAV.512.25: 1932–
1946, Benjamin Cohen [1937–1940], Box 2) (“As I wrote you last summer, I thought it was a fine 
and courageous thing for you to take on, a job which was bound to involve stepping on a number of 
toes. Nonetheless you have done it with rare distinction and I think it should give you great satisfac-
tion to know you have performed a most difficult public service with superb tact, skill and ability.”); 
see also Letter from Thomas Corcoran to James M. Landis (Jan. 11, 1940) (on file with Harvard 
University Archives, Dean’s Subject Files UAV.512.25: c. 1932–1946, 1937–1940, Box 2) (“I do 
want to tell you belatedly, just to relieve the monotony of the brickbats I suppose you’ll get for 
months that I think your courage to speak the truth in the Bridges matter was worthy of you and the 
hopes of many of us in you and the traditions of the greatest job in the United States which you now 
hold [as Dean of Harvard Law School]. The more I see of these shifting sands and the endless irrec-
oncilability of political ambition, the more I know you were a million times wise in choosing to 
build where you were entirely your own master.”). 
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Landis handled the investigation and the clarity of his final report was 
essential to demonstrate the efficacy of the administrative process, secure 
its legitimacy, and uphold the rule of law.
91
 All of this poses a critical 
question: What happened to the New Deal paradigm? 
The shorthand answer is that definitions of expertise have changed, 
and the lack of meaningful acceptance by industry of the moral obliga-
tions associated with the disclosure paradigm has brought us to a tipping 
point. However, this is not new. Indeed, it was evident as early as 1960 
and was identified by Landis himself in what was to be his last public 
intervention in regulatory politics. In late 1960, Landis provided an ex-
traordinary report to President-elect John F. Kennedy.
92
 
The report highlighted both the ambition and the intrinsic flaws as-
sociated with the delegation of discretion. The policy problem was that 
once authority was ceded, it became impossible to limit or retract. In-
deed, 
                                                        
 91. There are contemporary and uncanny resonances in the exercise of discretion in the dispute 
between Judge Jed Rakoff and the SEC regarding the SEC’s preference for resolving disputes 
through settlements instead of litigation. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 510 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), in which Judge Jed Rakoff described the proposed settlement in relation to the 
claim that Bank of America had misled investors over the payment of bonuses to executives within 
Merrill Lynch as “a contrivance designed to provide the S.E.C. with the facade of enforcement and 
the management of the Bank with a quick resolution of an embarrassing inquiry.” Judge Rakoff 
reluctantly signed off on the settlement, citing judicial restraint but stating that the settlement was 
“half-baked justice at best.” SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6829, 2010 WL 624581, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010). This settlement of $2.43 billion was preceded by a similar derivative suit 
settled in May 2012 for $20 million. Peter J. Henning & Steven M. Davidoff, For Bank of America, 
More Trouble from Merrill Lynch Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes. 
com/2012/09/28/the-cost-of-putting-the-merrill-lynch-merger-behind-it/. Similar frustration has been 
voiced by Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle who refused to endorse a $75 million fine agreed by Citigroup 
to settle charges that the bank had misled investors over its sub-prime exposure. See Kara Scannell, 
Judge Won’t Approve Citi-SEC Pact, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704868604575433833841630548.html (“I look at this and say, ‘Why would I 
find this fair and reasonable?’. . . You expect the court to rubber-stamp, but we can’t.”). See general-
ly Binyamin Appelbaum, U.S. Judges Sound Off on Bank Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at 
B1, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/business/24judges.html (noting broader oppo-
sition to recent settlements proposed with Barclays, Citigroup, and Bank of America); for recent 
media coverage of Rakoff’s dispute with the SEC, see Rakoff’s Revenge: Rejection of Settlements for 
Financial Institutions Are Catching On, ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2013, available at  http://www.econo 
mist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576132-rejections-settlements-financial-institutions-are-ca 
tching-rakoffs. For a discussion of wider risks to regulatory authority, see Justin O’Brien, The Fa-
çade of Enforcement: Goldman Sachs, Negotiated Prosecutions, and the Politics of Blame, in HOW 
THEY GOT AWAY WITH IT: WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS AND THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 178 (Su-
san Will et al. eds., 2012). 
 92. SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH 
CONG., REP. ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960). 
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[O]n the contrary, the tendency is to expand them as more and more 
complex problems arise. The legislative standards under which the 
delegations are made are similarly increasingly loosened so that not 
infrequently the guide in the determination of problems that faces 
the agencies is not much more than their conception of the public 
interest.
93
  
Landis, however, maintained that delegation was necessary and rendered 
even more persuasive given the increased complexity of modern society, 
the incapacity of Congress to devote the time or the resources to deal 
with them, and a conviction that “the issues involved were different from 
those that theretofore had been traditionally handled by courts and thus 
were not suited for judicial determination.”94 
Landis further warned Kennedy that, in sharp distinction to the op-
timism that accompanied the New Deal, the “fires that then fed a passion 
for public service have burned low.”95 He attributed this to rising cyni-
cism, unacceptable delays, increased costs, and deterioration in the quali-
ty of staffing:  
[The] prevalence is threatening to thwart hope so bravely held some 
two decades ago by those who believed that the administrative 
agency, particularly the ‘independent’ agency, held within it the 
seeds for the wise and efficient solution of the many new problems 
posed by a growingly complex society and a growingly benevolent 
government.
96
  
Urgent action was required because “the spark, the desire of public ser-
vice, has failed of re-ignition.”97 
Complaining of sinecures and the power of practitioners to gain 
privileged off-the-record access to senior commission staff, Landis fore-
shadowed many of the recurrent problems associated with the regulatory 
capture literature.
98
 Landis also complained bitterly about the failure to 
address foreseeable problems. Absent such planning, the need for ad hoc 
solutions to the particular manifestations of the problem precedes and, 
                                                        
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 9. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
 97. Id. at 10. 
 98. The concern about moral rectitude of regulatory authorities pre-dated the passage of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Ferdinand Pecora, who administered the hearings regarding Wall 
Street abuse, said the legislation to create a specialist agency to monitor the securities market would 
“be a good or bad law depending upon the men who administer it.” SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 
100. 
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indeed, may preclude any basic policy formulation.
99
 However, as Landis 
put it, where the greatest gaps exist are in the planning for foreseeable 
problems. This ultimately is a question of political design, a fact Landis 
always recognized.
100
 
By 1960, the unease about governmental power and authority—that 
was to transmogrify into outright opposition in the Reagan era and be-
yond—was already apparent. The problem intensified because the defini-
tion of what constituted expertise became contested, not least because the 
repository of knowledge moved geographically from Washington, D.C. 
to Wall Street itself, where it was legitimated by appeals to an earlier 
moral order and an elevation of freedom of contract over the substantive 
demands of the disclosure paradigm.
101
 
This reframing of discourse did not happen by accident; rather, it 
was the result of a considered and sustained campaign that corrupted 
both the capacity and legitimacy of regulatory intervention. The implica-
tions of this narrow framing are now playing out in the Libor scandal, 
which, unlike the design and marketing of sophisticated financial prod-
ucts, is based on straightforward (and readily understandable) fraud and 
deceit. It is in this broader political context that Libor and its reform have 
such potential programmatic and paradigmatic power. This in turn has 
profound implications for the conceptual frameworks that underpin con-
temporary regulatory practice, practice that is informed by timidity rather 
than audacity, inaction, and the maintained faith in what Roosevelt 
would have termed false prophets. It is a response that would—
justifiably—have horrified both the President and his chief regulatory 
architect, James M. Landis. 
Undoubtedly, any successful proposal to extend responsibility and 
accountability to those involved in product design, rather than clarifying 
the enabling conditions governing marketing and sale, would constitute a 
seismic shift in the structure of the financial services industry. Specifical-
ly, it would breach the self-referential logic of private law. The integra-
                                                        
 99. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 16 (Greenwood Press 1974) 
(1938). 
 100. It is more than a little ironic that Landis was to fall afoul of a foreseeable problem in the 
non-payment of his income tax. It meant his effective retirement from public life. MCCRAW, supra 
note 31, at 207. 
 101. See Seumas Miller, Institutions, Integrity Systems and Market Actors, in PRIVATE 
EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 339 
(Justin O’Brien ed., Imperial College Press 2007). As Miller points out, “even the most staunch free 
marketeers have normative or ethical commitments: they are committed, in particular, to the ethical 
value of the social institution of private property, the moral force of contractual obligations, and the 
human right of individual freedom.” Id. at 342. 
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tion of more explicit interventionist normative objectives with enabling 
ones may also significantly change the ethical boundaries of global fi-
nance. Before evaluating the reform agenda, it is essential to explain just 
how debilitating and unsustainable the ethical deficit has become. 
III. THE COMMODIFICATION AND CORRUPTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
The sense of frustration and, indeed, despair within the British gov-
ernment and regulatory agencies over the behavior of Barclays, and other 
banks, in submitting patently false returns to the Libor panel that sets 
global interest rate benchmarks was palpable from the outset. The avun-
cular Business Secretary, Vince Cable, spoke of the need to clean up 
what he termed the “cesspit” of British banking following the admission 
by Barclays in June 2012 that it had manipulated the rate.
102
 The Gover-
nor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, accused the bank of “deceitful 
manipulation.”103 The scandal, he said, provides evidence 
that “something went very wrong with the UK banking industry and we 
now need to put it right.”104 Perhaps the most telling reflection, however, 
came from Lord Adair Turner, the outgoing Chairman of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), which itself was later disbanded as a conse-
quence of failing to police the market. For Lord Turner, the manipulation 
revealed a “degree of cynicism and greed which is really quite shock-
ing . . . and that does suggest that there are some very wide cultural is-
sues that need to be strongly addressed.”105 This dismay also informs the 
findings of the United Kingdom Treasury Select Committee, which is 
equally dismissive of regulatory capacity.
106
 The concern that a failure of 
                                                        
 102. Oliver Wright, Simon English & Jim Armitage, Cable: The City Is a Massive Cesspit, 
INDEPENDENT (June 30, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/cable-the-city-is-
a-massive-cesspit-7900034.html (U.K.). 
 103. Philip Aldrick, King Attacks ‘Deceitful’ Banking Culture, TELEGRAPH (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9364187/King-attacks-deceitful-banking-culture.html 
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 104. Id. 
 105. Patrick Jenkins, John Gapper & Brooke Masters, The Gathering Storm, FIN. TIMES (June 
29, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26d8a33c-c1e0-11e1-8e7c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2SA 
kFoWi5. 
 106. HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, FIXING LIBOR: SOME PRELIMINARY 
FINDINGS, 2012–13, H.C. 481-I (U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/com 
mons-committees/treasury/Fixing%20LIBOR_%20some%20preliminary%20findings%20-%20VOL 
%20I.pdf; see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT: A REVIEW OF THE EXTENT OF 
AWARENESS WITHIN THE FSA OF INAPPROPRIATE LIBOR SUBMISSIONS (2013) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/ia-libor.pdf. The Internal Audit Report found, 
[T]he FSA’s focus on dealing with the implications of the financial crisis for the capital 
and liquidity positions of individual firms, together with the fact that contributing to or 
administering LIBOR were not ‘regulated activities’, led to the FSA being too narrowly 
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regulatory oversight facilitated the development of such a pernicious cul-
ture informs parliamentary evaluation. This suspicion has played out in 
the nature of the settlement arrangements and public concern about 
whether they are sufficient to change culture. The efficacy of regulatory 
settlements depends on their contractual terms rather than the size of the 
newspaper headlines they generate. 
Barclays’s disclosure and settlement derived from a joint transatlan-
tic investigation into how the Libor rate is calculated. Barclays agreed to 
pay $200 million to the CFTC, $160 million to settle related charges 
brought by the Department of Justice, and $93.2 million to the FSA in 
the United Kingdom. The cumulative fines reflected the fact that the ma-
nipulation did not simply predate the crisis but continued throughout 
it.
107
 In December 2012, UBS became the next bank to settle. This time 
the penalty increased to $1.5 billion ($700 million for the CFTC, $500 
million for the Department of Justice, $260 million for the FSA, and $63 
million in disgorgement of profits for the Swiss regulatory authority, 
which does not have the capacity to levy direct fines). In other words, 
U.S. regulatory authorities secured just under 80% of the total financial 
penalties. The Department of Justice also announced that criminal prose-
cutions would proceed against two traders. Furthermore, a non-
prosecution agreement with the parent company was announced in ex-
change for a $400 million fine. UBS Securities Japan, the subsidiary of 
the Swiss firm at the heart of the scandal, agreed to plead guilty to ma-
nipulating the Libor rate in exchange for a $100 million fine. In February 
2013, RBS became the third bank to settle ($150 million to the Depart-
ment of Justice, $325 million to the CFTC, and $137 million to the FSA). 
Media reports suggest that Deutsche Bank is next to seek a settlement 
                                                                                                                            
focused in its handling of LIBOR-related information. This was both in terms of chal-
lenging and inquiring about that information, and considering its conduct responsibilities 
in relation to the Principles for Businesses and any potential for consumer or market det-
riment. 
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra, at 9. This criticism of the FSA’s emphasis on technical compliance is 
even more pronounced in the findings of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, as 
evidenced in its coruscating report of the FSA’s failure to regulate HBOS. “The FSA’s approach also 
encouraged the Board of HBOS to believe that they could treat the regulator as a source of interfer-
ence to be pushed back, rather than an independent source of guidance and, latterly, a necessary 
constraint upon the company’s mistaken courses of action.” PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON 
BANKING STANDARDS, ‘AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN’: THE FAILURE OF HBOS, 2012–13, 
H.L. 144, H.C. 705, at 49 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa 
/jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/144/144.pdf. 
 107. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., Barclays Fined £59.5 Million for Significant Failings in 
Relation to LIBOR and EURIBOR (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/ 
communication/pr/2012/070.shtml. 
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with its home regulator, BaFin. Like its Swiss counterpart, BaFin lacks 
power to impose financial penalties but can either revoke a license or 
demand board changes if knowledge of wrongdoing can be directly at-
tributed.
108
 In addition, largely beneath the radar lies an antitrust investi-
gation by the European Commission, which has the power to impose ma-
terial fines of up to 10% of global turnover in cartel cases, a formulation 
explicitly used by the Competition Commissioner.
109
 The possibility of 
                                                        
 108. An investigation by BaFin led by its head of banking supervision, Raymond Roeseler, has 
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has made clear, at least in the Southern District of New York, public enforcement agencies are the 
only ones with the authority and legitimacy to implement such changes. LIBOR-Based Fin. Instru-
ments Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 1285338, at *62. This was largely attributable to an earlier state-
ment by Judge Buchwald: 
Your job as plaintiffs’ counsel looking for whopping attorneys’ fees is not to piggyback 
on the government. . . . I don’t understand, as someone who has some familiarity with the 
plaintiffs’ bar, why you guys weren’t all over this earlier. You are not entitled to massive 
attorneys’ fees if all you do is wait for the government to act, jump on their back and say 
we want massive damages [for our clients] and we want one-third of them. 
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insurance restrictions and materiality associated with any cartel settle-
ment has made a global settlement a priority.
110
 
In each individual case to date, the disjuncture between stated and 
lived values is linked to the failure of internal compliance or disclosure 
to counteract it. The financial penalties alone, while substantial, are un-
likely to change culture if regarded as a price for doing business. The 
hoary bifurcation of whether prescriptive “rules” or more granular articu-
lation of “principles” are more effective in guiding market behavior is 
redundant. Each had failed to address what is now widely acknowledged 
to be a systemic ethical deficit.
111
 
The moral deficit underscores how ineffective the normative capac-
ity of compliance is in embedding cultural change if perceived to be little 
more than a necessary minimum legal and mechanistic response to (un-
warranted) external restraints.
112
 The extraordinary testimony provided 
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by senior bankers at RBS to the British Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards in February 2013 offers a compelling rationale to ex-
ternally validate protestations of commitment to cultural reform. Follow-
ing a standard script, the banking executives were, in turn, shocked at the 
crookedness involved in the manipulation of Libor, dismayed at the lack 
of moral restraint, and keen to differentiate between ethical bankers and 
amoral traders. 
The class system that has always informed city mores was, there-
fore, at the fore. As the elite blamed the collusion that undermined Libor 
on the traders, altogether it appeared a different breed governed (if at all) 
by elastic conceptions of probity. A familiar refrain was evident. If the 
bankers, ostensibly in control, were guilty of anything, it was, according 
to then-serving head of investment banking John Hourican, excessive 
trust.
113
 So what, if anything, have the bankers remembered? It would 
appear not a lot, other than self-pity and special pleading. “As I have said 
to some people who have been willing to listen, they should not waste 
my death,” Mr. Hourican told the Commission.114 He had resigned to 
take “ultimate responsibility” for something for which he should not nec-
essarily be blamed.
115
 The issue was not a core concern given the fact 
that the board and senior executives thought that they had to prioritize 
dealing with an existential threat to the bank.
116
 Instead of dealing with 
misaligned incentives, the bank had (it was inferred, himself included) 
exhibited “blind trust” in the actions of traders.117 It was a message re-
peated by the bank’s chief executive, Stephen Hester, who will keep his 
job if not his bonus. The scale of the abuse was, Mr. Hester intoned, “too 
readily redolent of a selfish and self-serving culture in the banking indus-
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try as a whole . . . which needs to be addressed . . . and of course that is 
exactly the reason for this Commission’s existence.”118 
Of course, nodding to the authority of the Commission is not the 
same as abiding by its recommendations. The scale of the crisis was such 
that, according to the bank’s chairman, Sir Philip Hampton, no useful 
purpose could be served by “a series of assassinations.”119 The forced 
departure of Mr. Hourican would suffice. Yet, this left many uncomfort-
able questions, most forcibly articulated by the designate-Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Justin Welby, himself a former corporate executive. How 
many whistleblowers, asked the Archbishop, had come forward in ad-
vance of regulatory inquiries?
120
 Mr. Hourican and his colleagues could 
provide only one answer: none.
121
 The Archbishop was incredulous: 
“Why? Was there not one person anywhere who thought . . . this is just 
not the right way to behave? . . . How do you set a culture in the fu-
ture?”122 
The manner in which the bank staff reacted to this line of question-
ing speaks volumes about the malaise facing international banking. Mr. 
Hourican cautioned that he wanted “the culture of the company to be one 
of calling each other to attention, much rather than using a whistleblow-
ing channel. Having a lot of whistleblowing in a company . . . is almost 
as bad,” he declared, without explaining what he meant by either state-
ment.
123
 Attempts to elucidate meaning became harder as he sought to 
justify the unjustifiable: “[W]hat we want to have is a culture where peo-
ple hold each other to a high level of moral account,” he argued, trumpet-
ing the fact that 1,000 graduates had been appointed,
124
 without explain-
ing how these junior-level appointments could “stand[] up and feel[] the 
anger that exists around the issue, the industry[,] and . . . our compa-
ny;”125 exert control; or be protected from contamination of a pervasive 
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culture that the executive admitted they were shocked by. Ignorance is, 
however, a shocking abdication of reasonability. 
Hourican’s colleague, Johnny Cameron, was asked directly how to 
test for the moral culture of a trading floor. His answer, as reported by 
the Telegraph, was instructive: “That’s straying into philosophical terri-
tory. I do think that traders have a particular approach to life and need 
much tighter controls.”126 By inference bankers were, and remain, a dif-
ferent breed, which could be trusted by the establishment, including the 
Church of England—formally represented in the Commission by Arch-
bishop Welby who was less than impressed by the bankers’ reprise of the 
Pardoner’s refrain in The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer’s classic work: Ra-
dix Malorum Est Cupiditas (“Greed is the Root of All Evil”). 
The crisis and its aftermath demonstrate that much more holistic 
approaches to risk management, which link private rights to public du-
ties, are required. It is this more holistic approach that informed the early 
(and now partially lost) agenda of both the Federal Trade Commission 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission under James M. Landis. 
The recently released archives also make clear that across a whole 
swathe of industries, there was early recognition at the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission that, far from 
weakening power, the acquiescence of industry to the creation of codes 
of conduct provided an opportunity to retain it. Reclaiming this history 
becomes essential given the apparent interest of the British Banking As-
sociation and Martin Wheatley at the Financial Conduct Authority in the 
development of a code of conduct administered by either regulatory 
agencies or a body regulated by industry
127
 and given the fact that, as of 
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2012), available at http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/Anthony%20Browne%20speech%20at 
%202012%20International%20Banking%20Conference%20-%2017%20Oct%2012.pdf. In January 
2013, the BBA submitted an options paper to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 
canvassing support for a code of conduct administered by either the Financial Conduct Authority, its 
prudential counterpart, or administered through what it termed the Banking Standards Review Coun-
cil. Press Release, British Banking Ass’n, BBA Publishes Options Paper on Banking Standards (Jan. 
15, 2013), available at http://www.bba.org.uk/media/article/bba-publishes-options-paper-on-banking 
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April 2, 2013, Libor itself became a regulated activity.
128
 The critical 
question, therefore, is whether the self-referential development and sub-
sequent policing of a code of conduct is either desirable or sustainable? 
History suggests caution. 
IV. REGULATING CULTURE 
The redesign of Libor takes place in a conceptual vacuum. It is 
mired by a preference for tick-the-box compliance over ethical sub-
stance. The reform agenda is predicated on the introduction of new sys-
tems to collate information but provides no guidance to ascertain whether 
they actually work in changing the culture of individual firms or the 
market as a whole. Along with the Wheatley Review,
129
 the most articu-
lated conception of responsibility lies with the release of IOSCO princi-
ples in April 2013, related to governance, quality of data and methodolo-
gy, and accountability.
130
 Each seeks to place primary responsibility on 
an administering organization, with any outsourcing subject to oversight 
by the administrator. The framework is tailored to the disclosure of any 
material conflicts of interest to [non-defined] stakeholders and any rele-
vant Regulatory Authority, along with publication of control mecha-
nisms, such as whistleblowing.
131
 
The IOSCO principles, in line with the Wheatley Review, further 
call for use of only  
prices, rates, indices or values that have been formed by the compet-
itive forces of supply and demand, and be anchored by observable 
transactions entered into at arm’s length between buyers and sellers 
in the market for the Interest the Benchmark measures. This princi-
ple recognizes that bona-fide observable transactions in markets 
provide a level of confidence for the prices or values used as the ba-
sis of the Benchmark are credible.
132
  
                                                                                                                            
-standards/press-releases. This code of conduct was explicitly canvassed in the Wheatley Review. 
“The Review recommends that the LIBOR administrator, through the oversight committee, should 
draft a code of conduct, in collaboration with contributors and market participants, which should 
serve as a manual for the internal governance and organisation of LIBOR submission, detailing the 
specific requirements for firm behaviour and procedures.” WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 9, at 30. 
 128. Press Release, British Banking Ass’n, LIBOR Becomes a Regulated Activity (Apr. 2, 
2013), available at http://www.bba.org.uk/media/article/libor-becomes-a-regulated-activity. 
 129. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 9, at 30–33. 
 130. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 14, at 7–11. 
 131. Id. at 7–8. Nowhere do the IOSCO principles define what constitutes “effectiveness.” 
 132. Id. at 8.  
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This does not appear to take into account the fact that these too can be 
manipulated (as uncovered by the CFTC investigation of UBS traders’ 
attempts to manipulate the Australian Bank Bench Rate, heralded as a 
potential alternative until the Australian Financial Markets Association 
scrapped the process in March 2013).
133
 Moreover, IOSCO calls for the 
development of a code of conduct for those involved in submitting rates 
but does not define what is required in this process.
134
 The lack of speci-
ficity is troubling given the evidence provided by the head of UBS to the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards in January: 
Regulators monitor, and control frameworks monitor and try to 
catch issues, but the difference is made by the people who are on the 
front line. They need to change their standards and abide by certain 
rules, not because they are imposed on them but because they be-
lieve in them.
135
 
The question of warranted trust in belief is therefore critical, and 
the failure to address it is a fundamental flaw. While the Wheatley Re-
view mandates that the “contributing banks and the rate administrator 
will together establish a code of conduct outlining requirements and re-
sponsibilities of individual firms,”136 nowhere does it articulate what is 
meant by “responsibility.” Once again, we find painful lessons from his-
tory in what happens when codes of conduct are presented as assurance 
of cultural change either by an industry seeking to protect its position or 
a regulator seeking to enhance its authority. 
In 1933, the notoriously erratic General Hugh Johnson, the head of 
the National Recovery Administration (NRA) in the United States, a new 
agency mandated to establish codes of conduct, ignored the possibility 
that these codes could be exceptionally problematic if not designed effec-
                                                        
 133. See Feast, supra note 4. The lack of explicit acknowledgement is rendered more difficult 
to comprehend given the fact that Gary Gensler, the head of the CFTC, serves on the IOSCO task-
force. 
 134. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 14, at 22 (Principle 13). IOSCO requires poli-
cies; it does not articulate what those policies should be or that they are, in fact, working. Likewise, 
the key accountability provision governing complaints (Principle 15) requires only the introduction 
of a system rather than a requirement to demonstrate that that system works. Id. at 23. The lack of 
granularity makes the recommendation for external audit (Principle 17) rather weak. Id. at 24–25. 
The relationship with regulatory agencies (Principle 18) seeks to make information available on 
request rather than providing for ongoing collaboration to ensure cultural change. Id. at 25. 
 135. PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, ORAL EVIDENCE TAKEN 
BEFORE THE PARL. COMM’N. ON BANKING STANDARDS, 2012–13, H.C. 606-xix (U.K.) (Response of 
Andrea Orcel, Chief Exec. Officer, UBS, to Question 1874) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/c606-xix/c60601.htm. 
 136. WHEATLY REVIEW, supra note 9, at 33. 
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tively. For Johnson, the NRA, unrestrained by past restrictions on coor-
dinated responses, marked an innovative “sociological experiment.” As 
he told a meeting of the National Retail Dry Goods Association in New 
York in January 1934, the NRA was not only more nimble but it could 
become a vital partner, something he deemed the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) incapable of.
137
 
The speech was a rearguard action against the FTC, which had in-
creasingly come to see the NRA itself as a failed experiment. Critically, 
the suspicion within the FTC coincided with the promulgation of the 
Code of Fair Competition for Investment Bankers, which was endorsed 
on November 27, 1933. The code had ensured that power to determine 
the extent of compliance would remain with the banks themselves. It 
mandated that the management committee administering the code would 
contain twenty-one voting members: fifteen appointed by the president 
of the Investment Banking Association of America, six through a “fair 
method to represent employers not members of the IBA[,] and a repre-
sentative appointed without vote by the President of the United States of 
America.”138 The effect was to lock the administration into a framework 
completely controlled by industry. 
Landis, by then heavily embroiled in disputes over the operation of 
the Securities Act, was horrified by the way in which industry was be-
having. “How truly despicable some of their tactics are. I really thought 
they were essentially decent though somewhat misguided people, but I 
have my doubts now,” he wrote Frankfurter on December 13, 1933. 
Those doubts were in part informed by unease about the willingness of 
industry to engage in meaningful partnership. This unease was captured 
by an internal report prepared for Landis and the other members of the 
FTC on the workings of the NRA. Assigned to be the chief legal liaison 
to General Johnson’s NRA, Millard Hudson was flabbergasted by what 
                                                        
 137. Hugh Johnson, Speech Delivered at the National Retail Dry Goods Association (Jan. 24, 
1934). 
There was—and there is about as much cooperation between the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Industry as there is between a lion tamer with a black-snake whip, a revolv-
er, and a strong-backed chair, standing in a cage with six great jungle cats snapping and 
snarling on six star-spangled hassocks—that is their version of economic planning and 
industrial self-government. 
Id. 
 138. INV. BANKERS ASS’N OF AM., CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR INVESTMENT BANKERS 
(1933). 
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he termed the “chaotic conditions” at the agency.139 He reported on De-
cember 6, 1933: 
There is hardly an important form of monopolistic practices which 
the Federal Trade Commission and the courts have endeavored to 
prevent in the past, that is not authorized and more or less explicitly 
provided for in these codes; not of course by individuals, but what is 
a great deal worse, by the cooperative activities of whole industries. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that any remonstrances against 
these things have resulted in any substantial improvement.
140
 
Two weeks later, Hudson provided a more in-depth account of regulatory 
failure. “The industries, having got the bit in their teeth, are running 
amok, and are bent upon destroying the good work accomplished by the 
Commission in the past and to prevent its doing any more in the future,” 
he reported on December 22nd.
141
 Hudson cited four principal reasons. 
First, no representative of the Commission had power to draw up and 
enforce a model code. Second, legal representatives were “practically all 
young inexperienced men, many of whom knew nothing whatever about 
the Commission’s work. It was easy for the industries to put things over 
on them.”142 Third, 
having given the industries in the early codes practically everything 
they asked for, it was difficult to refuse those which came later. But 
the most alarming development is the unwillingness of the Adminis-
trator to set up any effective form of control over the administration 
of the codes. He is leaving it, by his own statement, as far as possi-
ble to the boards set up within the industries themselves. This 
means that matters in which they are interested will receive atten-
tion and probably little else will.
143
 
The internal report was forwarded to Roosevelt, who in turn handed over 
responsibility for evaluation of code operation to the FTC, effectively 
limiting the power of the NRA long before the Supreme Court deemed it 
                                                        
 139. Memorandum from Millard E. Hudson to the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 22, 1933) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School, Papers of J.M. Landis, Box 18-8). 
 140. Memorandum from Millard E. Hudson to the Fed. Trade Comm’n: Work at the NRA 
(Dec. 6, 1933) (on file with the Harvard Law School, Papers of J.M. Landis, Box 18-8). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. The importance of Hudson’s insights cannot be overstated given the quixotic hope 
expressed in the Wheatley Review that ongoing calibration can be expected. “The benefit of industry 
guidance is that the rate administrator can develop the code of conduct over time; as both LIBOR 
and the market that it is intended to assess evolve, the requirements of its users will also change.” 
WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 9, at 31. 
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unconstitutional the following year. The release of the new material sug-
gests that the administration had come to the conclusion that the partner-
ship approach was a failure long before then, although for very different 
reasons.
144
 
For Landis and the other designers of the disclosure paradigm, its 
power, first set out in the Securities Act (1933) and reinforced by the 
Securities Exchange Act the following year, lay primarily in the capacity 
to set, evolve, and frame broader discourse. The aim was not to mandate 
organizational change as some early commentators, including William O. 
Douglas, advocated.
145
 Instead, disclosure was a means to an end, a nec-
essary response to societal obligation. It was a message repeatedly 
pressed by senior officials, first at the FTC and then the SEC. 
                                                        
 144. The loss of authority angered Johnson, who embarked on an increasingly histrionic and 
futile campaign to change the President’s mind. In his New York address, he argued: 
[I]t is stated that I suppressed a report of the Federal Trade Commission to the [P]resident 
on the operation of the NRA. I asked the Federal Trade Commission to send a man over 
here to see if we were doing properly what we had to do. He came but he never said a 
word to me. I now understand that he did report to the Commission in a paper marked 
confidential—one of those X21 confidential spy reports which no one had the courtesy to 
discover to me. There is suppression for you. I now learn that someone has sent it to the 
[P]resident. But I never heard of that report until last night when a self-invited counter 
espionage agent told me about its subject matter. There was nothing in it but a charge that 
we have made mistakes. Nobody is louder in that assertion than I. Apparently the 
[P]resident—gentleman that he is—ignored it. 
Johnson, supra note 137. 
 145. See William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE 
L.J. 171 (1933). Douglas viewed the disclosure paradigm as insufficient. What was required, he 
argued, was a much more substantive re-ordering of relations between market participants. This 
essentially corporatist approach, advocated mainly by the Columbia-based members of the original 
Roosevelt “brains trust,” was always regarded as suspect by Landis and his colleagues at Harvard, 
most notably Felix Frankfurter. The personal nature of these disputes became clear in January 2013, 
when Harvard Law School released additional personal papers of Landis, the driving force behind 
the creation and management of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Letters of James M. 
Landis (on file with the Harvard Law School). The papers include correspondence between Landis 
and Frankfurter, arguably the most influential academic advisor to the Roosevelt administration. 
This correspondence reflects a growing frustration by both men towards industry opposition to and 
academic misunderstanding of the paradigm shift associated with the passage of the Securities Act 
and its corollary, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Most notably, this derision was directed 
towards Douglas himself, who, it is clear, neither man entirely trusted from the very beginning. On 
March 6, 1934, Landis noted to Frankfurter that “Douglas seems to me to lack a tremendous sense of 
the realities that are involved in this problem and how the relentless drive for profits leads men to do 
things and then defend them.” Id. On March 17, 1934, Frankfurter replied that “Douglas is trying to 
reflect too much the people in the big offices and the business schools, among whom he likes to 
appear as a sound and knowing fellow.” Id. Frankfurter further stated that Douglas had privately 
opined that his “public articles against us are a form of high strategy. Well it’s too high for my eyes 
to scale.” Id. 
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Speaking in 1933, for example, Baldwin Bane, the chief of the se-
curities division of the FTC, which had primary initial responsibility for 
administering the Securities Act, argued that the only legislation 
that is founded upon a moral background that has been passed in the 
past twenty years, is the Securities Act. Its aim was to restore to a 
numbed national conscience some semblance of sensitivity. It was 
of a spirit such as this that the Securities Act was born, free of vin-
dictiveness that might easily have been attached to it, reasonable in 
its demands and build upon tried experience in their formulation. It 
would be idle to pretend that it does not ask something of the securi-
ty world, but it also promises much in return—the opportunity of 
creating a true and honorable profession by the assumption and ad-
equate discharge of public responsibilities.
146
 
When responsibility was transferred to the SEC the following year, its 
first chairman, Joseph Kennedy, gave a reinforcing address in Boston: 
We are seeking to recreate, rebuild, restore confidence. Confidence 
is an outgrowth of character. We believe that character exists 
strongly in the financial world; so we do not have to compel virtue; 
we seek to prevent vice. Our whole formula is to bar wrong-doers 
from operating under the aegis of those who feel a sense of ethical 
responsibility. We are eager to see finance as self-contained as it 
deserves to be, when ruled by Honor and Responsibility. . . . When 
abuses occur, checks and corrections arise. But the application of 
these processes is not the dead hand that some proclaim it to be. In-
stead, it is the assurance of Life and Strength, when Honesty and In-
telligence are present. We have been brought into being to help you 
as part of the public, which erects government for its service. But 
you best can help yourselves. You can make the investing of money 
honest. Then you will truly become brothers’ keeper. And to me 
that is to acquire merit.
147
 
In 1937, Landis told the New York Times, somewhat optimistically, 
that brokers “are beginning to realize more clearly that their interest is 
tied up with the public interest. They are beginning more often to subor-
dinate their own interest to the larger interest. People are beginning also 
to look upon the exchanges not so much as private institutions as public 
utilities.”148 Therefore, this linkage between private and public purpose 
                                                        
 146. Bane, supra note 25, at 592. 
 147. Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the Boston Cham-
ber of Commerce (Nov. 15, 1934), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1934/111534kenne 
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lay at the heart of the experiment. For Landis, “the art of regulating an 
industry requires knowledge of the details of its operations [and the] abil-
ity to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate.”149 
The real tragedy here is not the misplaced optimism of Landis but the 
misplaced trust in financial services sector statements that through their 
disclosures they had recognized their obligations. 
Landis’s early faith in governance by experts had already eroded by 
the time of the John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960. In part, this derived 
from what he saw as the failure of the agencies to remain focused on nar-
row regulatory purpose, a process that intensified because of patronage 
appointments at the level of the commission and declining commitments 
to the public service as a career. This, in turn, suggests the need for the 
dynamic integration of rules, principles, and social norms within an inter-
locking responsive framework. 
This explicit normative foundation has been lost in a debate over 
technicalities. Interestingly, it is a foundation that is not referenced in 
any of the official pronouncements on Libor. It does, however, underpin 
a separate British government-sponsored investigation into the operation 
of the capital markets. As John Kay has persuasively argued, sustainable 
reform must be predicated on capability to “restore relationships of trust 
and confidence in the investment chain, underpinned by the application 
of fiduciary standards of care by all those who manage or advise on the 
investments of others.”150 
Kay’s formulation builds on an insight first advanced by the recent-
ly retired managing director of the FSA, Hector Sants. He had famously 
complained that it was impossible for principles-based regulation to 
work when those charged with informal authority to maintain the integri-
ty of the system had no principles.
151
 This was not simply a particularly 
memorable aside. It reflected belated cognizance of the importance of 
what Oliver E. Williamson has termed the “non-calculative” social con-
tract.
152
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 150. JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION 
MAKING 9 (2012) (U.K.), available at http://www.ecgi.org/conferences/eu_actionplan2013/documen 
ts/kay_review_final_report.pdf. 
 151. “[T]he limitation of a pure principles-based regime have to be recognized [sic]. I continue 
to believe the majority of market participants are decent people; however a principles-based ap-
proach does not work with individuals who have no principles.” Sants, supra note 111. 
 152. See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 597 (2000). Williamson notes that analysis of this “level one” 
component of social theory is conspicuously absent from regulatory studies. The other three levels 
comprise institutional arrangements viewed primarily through property rights and positive political 
 
420 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:375 
Sustainable reform must also be consistent with principles of good 
regulation. It must be proportionate, consistent in application, transpar-
ent, and targeted. It is also clear, however, that the construction of ac-
countability mechanisms cannot rely on self-certification alone. It de-
mands external validation. The recent history of financial regulation has 
demonstrated conclusively the dangers of past self-referential framing. 
Ironically, the framework to measure and evaluate culture was outlined 
in 2010 by Sants while serving as the chief executive of the FSA. The 
regulatory executive, who now runs compliance and government and 
regulatory relations at Barclays, argued for triadic calculation: “[E]ven if 
you believe the regulator should and could judge culture, how would the 
regulator facilitate or enforce the adoption of its judgments by firms?”153 
Starting from the premise that society has the right to expect ethical 
behavior and warranted commitment to stated values, Sants maintained 
that regulators cannot avoid judging culture, a term he judged less prob-
lematic and more amenable to measurement than ethics: 
What should matter to the regulator are the outcomes that the cul-
ture delivers and that the firm can demonstrate it has a framework 
for assessing and maintaining it. . . . The regulator must focus on the 
actions a firm takes and whether the board has a compelling story to 
tell about how it ensures it has the right culture that rings true and is 
consistent with what the firm does.
154
 
This framing lies at the heart of the disclosure paradigm, and it must in-
form the operation and validation of codes of conduct. As we have seen 
with the leadership of British banking in particular, being an “Approved 
Person” is in itself no guarantee of integrity.155 The tragedy for both the 
banking industry and its regulators is that neither internal nor external 
oversight of the kind outlined by Sants was pursued until it was too late. 
Equally, the Kay Review appears unread or at least undigested. However, 
accountability and integrity, as Sants and Kay pointed out, are essentially 
design issues linked to normative agendas. It is time to get to work. A 
necessary starting point would be virtual attendance at the imaginary in-
augural lecture James M. Landis offered in 1931. It is time to go back to 
the seminar room. 
                                                                                                                            
theory, governance mechanisms through transaction cost economics, and resource allocation frame-
works generally examined through agency theory. Id. 
 153. Hector Sants, Chief Exec., Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech Delivered at the Mansion House 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The initial success of the New Deal experiment can be traced to the 
combination of five ideational and political economy factors. First, the 
policy imperatives of the initial Roosevelt Administration (1932–36) ad-
vanced the necessity and legitimacy of state intervention. Second, the 
policy imperatives were predicated on a rebalancing of private rights and 
public duties, a strategy that was subsequently overwhelmingly endorsed 
at the ballot box in 1936. Third, a progressive whittling away of the in-
fluential freedom of contract model generated legitimacy. Fourth, the 
nascent administrative agencies, in particular the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, placed a “cop on the beat,” doing much to restore 
public confidence. Fifth, the initial emphasis was not on direct enforce-
ment, but on changing industry practice through an associational model 
of governance. 
The model clearly specified its purpose. It sought to enroll market 
actors within a regulatory paradigm that replaced caveat emptor with a 
disclosure philosophy. At its core was a belief that sustainable reform 
could only be achieved at an industry-wide level in which there was an 
internalization of responsibility. The tragedy is that there remains very 
little acceptance of that obligation, notwithstanding the bailouts of the 
financial sector. The response of industry, now, as then, is to engage in 
negotiations in bad faith, limiting acceptance of responsibility. The Libor 
scandal demonstrates how little has changed in banking culture and the 
resulting policy framework how little has changed in regulatory framing. 
We will all pay the price for that miscalculation. This paper has taken 
seriously James M. Landis’s admonition that we should explore the 
shadows of the past to illuminate the present and future. It is time for this 
to be a corporate, regulatory, and political, as well as an academic, task. 
 
